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TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

i j In the Matter of the Arbitration
ii
between
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants

A W A R D
Cases 88-30 and 88-213

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The disciplinary letter, the fifteen (15)
day suspension and the discharge given to
and imposed on Gaines Salvant were not for
just cause. He shall be reinstated with
full back pay and benefits.

DATED: October 16, 1989
STATE OF New York )gs
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric/J.Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Nerfma Adams
Concurring

I, Norma Adams do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
pj/rk J. Siedlecki
Dissenting

U

I, Dirk J. Siedlecki do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants

OPINION OF NEUTRAL REFEREE
Cases 88-30 and 88-213

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The issues are:
[1]

Whether there was just cause for the
15 day suspension of Gaines Salvant,
and the disciplinary letter placed in
his file, and if not what shall be
the remedy?

[2]

Whether there was just cause for the
discharge of Gaines Salvant, and if not
what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on May 24, 1989 at which time Mr. Salvant
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. Ms. Norma Adams and Mr. Dirk
J. Siedlicki served respectively as the Union and Company arbitrators on the System Board, and the Undersigned was selected and
served as the Neutral Referee.

The Oath of the Board was waived.

The grievant was first suspended and later discharged becaus
he reached those sequential points in the Company's progressive
discipline policy for "No Shows" for flight assignments.
Significant in this case is the fact that the grievant was
not suspended and discharged under the generally accepted principles and disciplinary grounds for unsatisfactory attendance or
absenteeism, but rather, as acknowledged by the Company, for violations of a specific policy relating to and designed to control
and discipline for failure to protect flight assignment (i.e. "No
Shows").

-2Therefore the propriety of the discipline imposed on the
grievant in this case turns on whether in fact, he violated the
specific "No Show" policy and whether that policy was enforceable
and binding on him.
If the latter part of that question is answered in the negative an answer to the first part is immaterial.
If there is any well settled rule in industrial relations,
which is uniformly and consistently recognized and applied by
arbitrators, it is the rule on the effectiveness and enforceabilit
of policies resulting in employee discipline. This is compellingly so when the policy contains a specific step by step progression
of increasingly severe discipline, resulting, at specific points,
in the more severe penalties of suspension and discharge.

The

conditions for liability and enforceability are universely recognized.

They are:
That the policy and procedures reasonably relate to the jobs affected and to the performance of those jobs;
That the measures of discipline be reasonable
for the offenses;
That the policy or work rule be made known to
the covered work force by adequate notices,
postings, distribution or other dissemination;
That the policy or rule be evenhandedly and
consistently applied to all employees similarly situated.

All of these standards must be present and complied with
for the policy to be enforceable for discipline.
In this matter, the policy is clearly reasonable.

To ensure

the reliability of the Company's flight schedule, flight attendants are expected, properly, to meet their flight assignments,
and a record of "No Shows" need not be tolerated.
A review of the policy, with its points of warnings, letters

-3of discipline and suspension and finally discharge, shows a relation of reasonableness between the offenses and their cumulative
nature, and the levels of discipline imposed.
In this matter

there is, however, some evidence of dispar-

ate treatment, at least procedurally, in the application of the
steps and sequence of the "No Show" policy, between the grievant
and one or two other employees, similarly situated, to the grievant s disadvantage.

And on the question of whether he committed

all the violations alleged, there are grounds to consider whether
one of the grievant's :'Nc Shows" (the flight assignment on which
he was "balanced") should have been charged against him because
he may not have been properly notified and did not "okay" that
assignment.
But I need not decide those last two factors because I have
concluded that a different essential requirement for the enforceability of the Company's policy has not been met.
The Company acknowledges that it did not notify its employee
of the policy nor of its specific formula for discipline. It also
did not officially notify the Union of the policy or its implement
ation.
Indeed, the Union learned of it accidentally.

The Company

admits that the details of the policy were for the internal information of management and as a guide to management for the imposition of discipline in "No-Show" cases.
This is not to say that the grievant was not told, through
counseling and warnings, that he was subject to further discipline
and that his job was in jeopardy.

Rather, it is to say that he

was not put on notice of the precise sequence of steps and the
number and frequency of "No Shows" that would mechanically result
not just in the application of discipline, but, critically, the
point at which he would be suspended and discharged.
The Company's "No Show" policy is exact, as follows:

-4No Show Offense
1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Disciplinary Action Range
Letter of Warning
5~10 days removal from payroll
10-15 days removal from payroll
Termination (In some instances,
a 30 day removal might be
appropriate.)

Where, as here, the policy is so exact and progressively
inexorable, the employee is entitled to know, with similar precision and exactness, where he stands and what will next happen.
The reasons that he is entitled to that notice are also well
known.

Disciplinary programs and policies are not limited to the

imposition of penalties. Also, they are designed and intended to
rehabilitate and save the employee from further discipline by
changing his record and raising his performance to a satisfactory
level. By warning of specific consequences, step by step, of
failure and continuing failure to work to a satisfactory level,
the employee is given a fair chance to remedy his wrongs.

This

latter rehabilitative purpose is frustrated, or at least impeded,
if the policy is not well publicized to the work force.
Absent that notification, it remains solely punitive and
that is not enough to justify it, even if the penalties are reason
able and evenhanded.
Also, in my view, the notice requirement extends also to
the employee's bargaining agent. That the Company did not inform
the Union was a failure of the purposes of notice. Obviously,
discipline of its members is an important matter to the Union, not
just so that the Union can represent and defend its member, but so
that the Union can provide advice and counsel and assist the member towards rehabilitation.
If the Union is not a "partner" with
the Company in gaining employee compliance with rules and policies
it certainly has a legitimate part to play in helping its member
improve conduct and performance, thereby making discipline or
further discipline unnecessary.

And both the Company and the

-5Union should want that result. Not to notify the Union, and give
it a chance to participate is to make that result which is one of
the reasons for a discipline policy - all the more difficult.
For the reasons stated, this flaw is enough to procedurally
negate the discipline imposed on the grievant. I make no determinations on the grievant's "No Show" record or how or where it
would have fit in the Company's "No Show" policy, had that policy
been enforceable.

DATED: October 16, 1989
Eric J/ Schmertz
Neutral Referee

TWA - ALPA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association

A W A R D
Case No. NY-126-87

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned duly designated as the System Board of
i Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
I and allegations of said parties, make the following AWARD:
i
The Company did not have just and sufficient
cause for disciplining the grievant, Robert
Caceres, for the reasons set forth in Captain
S. Fallucco's letter dated October 8, 1987.
The disciplinary notice shall be expunged from
the grievant's record, and he shall be made
whole for pay lost, if any.

DATED: September 19, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) s s - -

Iric jr. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument_ which is my AWARD.

DATED: September
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Donald H. Brown
Concurring

I, Donald H. Brown do hereby a irm upon
Arbitrator that I am the individual
scribe
this instrument, which is my AWARD. /^Lr

DATED: September
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

executed

1989
Tohn R. Dell Isola
Concurring

I, John R. Dell Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which

-2-

jl
!' DATED: September^ 1989
!{ STATE OF
h COUNTY OF

Re'x A. Pitts
Dissenting

I, Rex A. Pitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described inland who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD. jCJL<^L( ,

DATED: September
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

Michael M. Fliniaft
Dissenting

I, Michael M. Fliniajjf do hereby aff
Arbitrator that I am the individual de.sc/i/
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
1

upon my Oath as
in and who executed

TWA - ALPA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No. NY-126-87

Air Line Pilots Association
and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:

Whether the Company had just and sufficient
cause for disciplining the grievant, Robert
Caceres, for the reasons set forth in Captain
Fallucco's letter dated October 8, 1987?
A hearing was held on May 5, 1989, at which time Mr. Caceres
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Captains Rex A. Pitts and

Michael M. Flinian served as the Company members of the Board of
Arbitration. Captains Donald H. Brown and John R. Dell Isola
served as the Union members of said Board.
as the Neutral Referee.

The Undersigned serve

The Oath of the Arbitrators' was waived,

a stenographic record of the hearing was taken and each side file
a post-hearing
session.

brief.

Thereafter

the board met in executive

Captain Fallucco's letter of October 8, 1987 reads:
Dear Captain Caceres:
The investigation referred to in my letter of
September 02, 1987, is concluded.
A meeting was held in my office on September
29, 1987, in which you stated your reasons for
not protecting Flight No. 770 on August 30,
1987, and subsequent events.
I understand that circumstances beyond your
control contributed to your inability to

-2protect your reassignment to Flight No. 770
from Flight No. 493 on August 30th as a result of an unexpected automobile difficulty.
However, I must remind you of the Flight Operations Manual, Chapter 6, Page 4, Item B.4:
"If a crew member expects to be absent from
his normal contact for any extended period of
time, he shall advise the responsible agency
of an 'interim contact.'" There had been several attempts to contact you at the hotel for
reassignment to Flight No. 770. Additionally,
your refusal to accept any further assignments
was a further disruption to TWA and your fellow
pilots.
I find these actions to be inappropriate. I
cannot agree with the reasons given for refusing further assignments. The events of
August 30th demonstrated a lack of committment
towards work obligations. As a result of this
incident, it is my intention to show you removed from schedule without pay for a period of
two (2) days. This discipline is to take effect
no sooner than ten (10) days after receipt of
this letter.
Based on the record before me, I do not find just cause for
the two day loss of pay penalty. The rule from the Flight Operations Policy Manual referred to in the aforesaid letter was not
violated in this case because the grievant did what apparently has
been an accepted or tolerated practice by pilots generally. Pilots
leave their normal contact for shopping trips, sightseeing, meals
and other relatively short periods of time without advising of an
"interim contact." In the instant case, the grievant did not intend to be away from his hotel location for an "extended period
of time."

He went with his girlfriend to see a house that he

planned to purchase for a move of his residence to that location.
He expected to be away for only a few hours, no longer than other
pilots regularly absent themselves from their normal contact for
the various personal activities referred to previously.

Before he

left, he notified his Captain and First Officer of his plans and
purpose.

His period away was unexpectedly extended because his

-3car broke down twice on the way back to his lay-over hotel.

There

is no evidence that his reported car trouble was falsified.

When

he realized he would not make it back to make his scheduled flight
assignment he called Crew Scheduling at a telephone number previously given to him for such purpose, and apparently informed
the Company

in time for a replacement to be obtained and for the

flight to be protected.
Under these circumstances I do not find that the grievant
"expected to be absent from his normal contact for an extended
period of time." (emphasis added)

Also, and alternatively, be-

cause the rule has not been enforced uniformly against other pilot;
in comparable circumstances, it cannot now be enforced against the
grievant.
Under this finding, it is immaterial if the Company tried
to contact him for a change in schedule while he was away from his
normal contact.

The same could have happened to other pilots who

were similarly absent for short periods and who were not disiplinei
Captain Fallucco's letter goes on to charge the grievant
with "refusal to accept any further assignments" which caused
"further disruption to TWA and your fellow pilots."

Aside from

the apparent need to call in replacements or reserves, there is
no evidence that any of the flights the grievant was asked to take
after he phoned the Company a second time when he finally got back
to his hotel, were cancelled or delayed, or that other pilots experienced "disruptions."
As a discipline case, the burden is on the Company not only
to prove the offense charged but also to establish the propriety
of the discipline imposed.

Here there is a sharp conflict over

|| what the grievant was told and what flights he was offered wnen
11
j i he first called in from the road when his car broke down and
|;

i after he got back to the hotel.

He testified that his first call

jj from the road when he informed the Company that he could not make

-4his regular flight, concluded with a statement by the Company's
| representative at Crew Scheduling that he "was off schedule." The
! Company denies making that statement.

Alternatively it argues

I

I that if said, it does not mean that the pilot is excused from
other replacement assignments that he could reasonably assume.
After he called from his layover hotel it is undisputed that
he was asked if he could take a number of other flights and declined to do so. However it is disputed whether as the Company
asserts he was re-offered his original flight.

The grievant denies

that that offer was made.
I do not find it necessary to make determinations on what
or what not he was offered after his return to his lay-over hotel.
,, I so conclude because I think that it was reasonable for the griev
| ant to believe that he was not obligated at that point to take
the flights offered. I think he had reasonable grounds to so believe because he had been told earlier that he was "off schedule"
and that that meant he was relieved of further work at least for
that day and that schedule, and was only obliged to 'get back into the schedule or back to his domicile within a reasonable time.
I think it likely that he may have been confused about what he wasj
to do (as he had never experienced this situation before) and rejected the flights offered not just because he found them inconvenient or undesirable, but because he thought he had the option tc
decline in view of his "off schedule" status.
The matter therefore narrows to whether he was told he was
"off schedule" and whether he had legitimate grounds to believe
that that meant he was relieved of an immediate obligation to resume scheduled flying.
The Company has not met its burden of rebutting the grievant

\t testimony that C

No Company official who spoke to the grievant in the original tele-phone conversation testified. The Company's case on what took
place in that conversation was adduced at the hearing by a witness

-5H who gained his knowledge from Company reports. The record dis11
|j closes that it is the Company's regular policy to tape the conji
|j versations between pilots and crew scheduling. Presumably a
j| recording of the grievant's first conversation with Crew Sched•i
ji uling was so recorded. The grievant and the Union on his behalf
I' asked for the tapes at the grievance procedure and for this arbi|; tration hearing, asserting that if they were listened to they woulc
ij disclose that Crew Scheduling told the grievant he was "off sched| ule." The Company did not produce the tapes which would have been
!:
j! the best evidence, and offered no reason why it did not do so. It
I! did not claim that the conversation was not taped nor did it claim
ii
that if taped, the tapes no longer existed.
Under that circumstance, I accept the grievant's direct
testimony that he was told he was "off schedule" rather than the
Company's hearsay testimony that he was not so told. Put another
way, the Company has within its control and custody the best evidence of the critical conversation. Not to produce that best evidence is to fatally prejudice its otherwise hearsay evidence.
Finally, I find nothing in the record showing that by instruction, regulation, or practice, the phrase "off schedule" does
not mean what the grievant thought it meant. If he was wrong, the
Company has not met its burden of showing that he was wrong or
more importantly, that he knew or should have known he was wrong.
Therefore the events that took place after he was told he was "off
schedule" cannot be held against him.

DATED: September 19, 1989

Eric /. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

TWA - PILOTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots

Association

A W A R D
Case # N Y 4 8 - £

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System

Board of

Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations

of the above-named parties, makes the following.

AWARD:
[1] For its acknowledged violation of Section
12(B)(3)(d) of the contract, based on its
later discovery that another "reserve pilot (was) available for the flight," the
Company shall grant the ;rievant,
|
S. Wet more
the remedy it offered at the hearing.

[2] The involuntary change in Wetmore's dutyfree period to assign him to protect Flight
5 which was scheduled to depart after the
beginning of his originally scheduled dutyfree period, was not a violation of Section
12(B)(3)(d) of the contract.

DATED: October 3, 1989
STATE OF New York )
ss
COUNTY OF New York

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.
DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Donald H. Brown Jr.
Concurring in #1 Above
Dissenting from #2 A b o v e

I, Donald H. Brown, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my A W A R D .

-2-

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

John R. Dell'Isola
Concurring in #1 Above
Dissenting from #2 Above

I, John R. Dell'Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Rex A. Pitts
Concurring in #1 and #2
Above

I, Rex A. Pitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

Michael M. Fliniau
Concurring in #1 and
Above

I, Michael M. Fliniau do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - PILOTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots

Association

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case #NY-48-88

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The issue involves the grievance filed by Captain 0. J.
Donovan challenging
period

the Company's action in changing the duty-free

of First Officer S. Wetmore.
A hearing was held on May 4, 1989

at which time First Officer

Wetmore, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" appeared as did
Captain Donovan and representatives of the above-named Union and
Company.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

Captains Rex A. Pitts and Michael M. Fliniau served as the
Company designated members on the System Board of Adjustment.
Captains Donald H. Brown, Jr. and John R. Dell Isola served as the
Union designated m e m b e r s on said Board.

The Undersigned was selec-

ted and served as the Chairman or Neutral Referee.
the Board was waived.

The Oath of

A stenographic record was taken and the

parties filed post-hearing briefs.

The Board met in executive

session in St. Louis on September 12, 1989.
Resolution of the disputed part of the grievance requires
an interpretation of Section

12(B)(3)(d) of the contract under

facts which the Company thought obtained at the time it changed
the grievant's duty free period without his consent.
reads :

Said Section

-2A pilot's duty-free period may never be changed
retroactively. The duty-free periods may be
changed prospectively by mutual agreement between the pilot and the Company. The Company
may schedule any reserve pilot to fly a trip
terminating at the pilot's home domicile no
later than twelve (12) hours after the scheduled commencement of such preplanned duty-free
periods. A pilot who flies into such a period
shall have his/her required rest period and then
commence his/her duty-free period. When no other
reserve pilot is available for the flight the
Company may change such duty-free period(s) without the pilot's consent.
In the instant case, the grievant was scheduled for a dutyfree period to begin at 0001

on March 27, 1988.

On March 26,

he was notified by the Company that he was assigned
Flight 5 scheduled to depart at 1900

1988

to protect

on March 27th, and that his

duty-free period was being changed to a later period so that he
could undertake the new assignment.

The grievant accepted that

assignment under protest, and the instant grievance resulted.
The Company made the duty-free period change pursuant to the
last sentence of the foregoing

Section, namely:

When no other reserve pilot is available for
the flight the Company may change such dutyfree period(s) without the pilot's consent.
The critical fact in this case is that Flight 5 which the
grievant was assigned

to protect, and because of which his duty-

free period was changed, was scheduled to depart at a time later
than' when his original duty-free period was scheduled to begin.
That is what the Union objects to in this proceeding and what the
Union asserts is a violation of the foregoing contract Section.
Before going further it is appropriate at this point to note
that at the outset of the hearing the Company acknowledged that it
had learned

(apparently during the processing of the grievance or

in preparation for this arbitration) that another reserve pilot
was available at the time the grievant's

duty-free period was

changed without his consent and that that reserve pilot should
have been assigned to Flight 5 rather than the grievant.
of this later acknowledged

Because

violation of the contract Section the

Company offered to grant the grievant the appropriate contractual
remedy, and argued that the dispute herein was moot.
I ruled that the grievance which was based on what the Company did in the belief

that no reserve pilot was available re-

moved a justiciable issue, inasmuch as the parties remain in dispute over whether the Company could do what it did on the basis of
what the Company thought the facts were at the time.

A n d , as the

Company maintained in this case that it had or would have the
contractual right to involuntarily change the grievant's duty-free
period under the facts it thought obtained, that situation, as
grieved by the Union, is still disputed in this case and is therefore a matter for determination by this System Board.
In short, the grievance and hence the issue is, when there
is no other reserve pilot available, may the Company change the
duty-free period of a pilot without his consent and assign that
pilot to protect a flight which is scheduled to depart after what
would have been the commencement of that pilot's original dutyfree period?
The Board will answer that question inasmuch as it remains
a viable dispute between the parties, and is reflected in the
grievance itself.

However, as the Company concedes a contract

violation based on different facts (namely its discovery that an-

-4-

other reserve pilot was in fact available) our Award shall grant
the contractual remedy for that violation.
On the issue before us, the Company argues that Section 12(B
(3)(d) expressly authorizes such a change in a duty-free period
under the language of its last sentence.

Indeed, asserts the Com-

pany, as it procedurally first changes a pilot's duty-free period,
thereby pushing that period back beyond the departure time of the
flight to be protected, there is no longer a scheduled duty-free
period into which the assignment of that flight would encroach.
In other words,

the situation as objected to by the Union would

not in fact exist.
The Union disputes this sequential procedure and its logic.
No matter how you look at it, it argues, a pilot's personal plans
for his duty-free period are disrupted by a change in that period,
whether the change is made before or simultaneous with the involuntary assignment of the flight to be protected.

Furthermore, and

in specific opposition to the circumstancesof this case, the disruption is especially egregious because it disturbs a duty-free
period and plans made for the use of that period that was original
ly scheduled to begin before the assigned flight is to be flown.
When there is such a material disruption, asserts the Union, the
junior available pilot should be called in under the inversal provisions of the contract.

In short, it is the junior pilot, not

the more senior pilot scheduled for a duty-free period, who should
be inconvenienced.
Aside from this equitable argument, the Union claims that
the proper interpretation of Section 12(B) (3 ) (d) bars the Company
from so acting.

-5-

The Union argues that under Section 12(B)(3)(d) duty-free periods
can be changed under limited circumstances without the pilot's con
sent and that those circumstances provide or imply that the flight
to be protected must be scheduled to depart before the beginning
of the originally scheduled duty-free period.

It points out the

only encroachment allowed on and into a duty-free period is the
assignment to a flight that "is scheduled to terminate less than
twelve (12) hours after that duty-free period has commenced."
Perforce, such a flight must have begun before the commencement of the duty-free period, because the contract language speaks
of that flight "fly(ing) into such a period" and is limited to an
encroachment of no more than twelve hours, "terminating at the
pilot's home domicile."
From this the Union asserts that any encroachment on a dutyfree period is similarly limited to flights departing before the
commencement of that period.

Specifically that the last sentence:

"When no other reserve pilot is available for
the flight, the Company may change such dutyfree period(s) without the pilot's consent,"
which immediately follows the foregoing conditional sentence must
be so conditioned too.

Put another way, the Union claims that

Section 12(B)(3)(d) should be read as an entity, and that its
common thread and intent, under circumstances where a pilot's duty
free period is involuntarily changed, is to limit that change,
expressly under the second and third sentence, and impliedly to
the last sentence, to a flight that departs earlier than the
commencement of the duty-free period.
The Union's interpretation is reasonable and logical.

How-

-6-

ever it is not the only reasonable and logical interpretation.
Just as acceptable is an interpretation that flying into a dutyfree period, for a period not to exceed twelve hours is the only
encroachment allowed without changing the duty-free period, and
that under other circumstances as contemplated by the last sentence
the duty-free period must be changed.

In other words, rather than

the twelve hour provision being a limit on the last sentence, it
is instead the exception to the last sentence.
Additionally, the last sentence itself contains no limitatio
It unconditionally provides for a change in a duty-free period
under one specific circumstance, and that is when no other reserve
pilot is available.

It does not limit its application to flights

preceeding the duty-free period, and had that circumstance been
intended, the parties could have so provided.
The upshot of these two logical but different interpretation
is to create the classical ambiguity.

Ambiguities are clarified

by negotiation- history and by past practice.

Here, no evidence

of what took place when the contract language was negotiated was
introduced into this record.

And though the Company alleged a

past practice supportive of its position, it could not cite specific examples or other probative actions comparable to what is
presently in dispute.

So I cannot find a dispositive past practic

Absent evidence of the negotiating history or past practice,
the Arbitrator is left to the traditional "burden of proof."

That

burden is on the grieving party, here the Union, to prove its case
clearly and convincingly.

Though I think the Union believes that

the Company is misusing 12(B)(3)(d) to avoid or evade the difficul
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to justify utilization of an inversal, I cannot find that the language of Section 12(B)(3)(d) clearly prohibits the Company from
applying it as it did in this case.

A n d , it is not yet at a point

where an "abuse" of that Section can be claimed.
Finally, on the Union's equitable argument, I think that a
change in a duty-free period can be equally disruptive whether it
is done to protect a flight leaving before the original duty-free
period is to begin or after it was to begin.

Notification of a

change a day before, for example, to protect a flight leaving
earlier, within a matter of hours, can be no less unsettling to
personal plans as the same notification, but for a flight which
will depart, as in the instant case, sometime after the duty-free
period was to begin.

In both instances, the duty-free period is

changed (except for the 12 hour allowed encroachment) and with
that change, in both cases on short notice, personal plans are
disturbed.
In short, so long as the pilot is notified before his original duty-free period is scheduled to begin, thechange in his dutyfree period may be equally disruptive, regardless of when the flight
to be protected departs.
If I am wrong in this analysis, it, together with a clarification of the contract language, is a matter for negotiations.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: October 3, 1989

TWA - PILOTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

A W A R D
Case No. NY-123-88

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The Company violated Section 12(B)(3)d of
the contract when in September 1988 at the
JFK domicile it changed Captain Donovan's
duty free period without his consent.
The Company shall cease and desist from using Section 12(B)(3)d of the contract to
change a pilot's duty free period without
his consent to place that pilot on standby
duty.

DATED: November 22, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric If. Schmertz
Neut/ral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
execu£e,d this instrumerU:, which is my AWARD.
^^^t^^t^^^^^\
DATED: November -3d 1989
STATE OF f
COUNTY OF S7

v
Donald E. Brown, Jr.
Concurring
?

I, Donald H. Brown, Jr. do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual d s c r i b e d iruand who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD
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DATED: November
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

I, Eugene F. Corcoran, Jr. do hereby affirm upon ray Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

<<
II
j l DATED: November
|| STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

RexVA. Pitts
Dissenting

I, Rex A. Pitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described inSfprti who executed this instru
ment which is my AWARD.

DATED: November
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

McKinney
Dissenting

I, W. F. McKinney do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrate
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instru
ment which is my AWARD.

TWA-PILOTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

OPINION OF
NEUTRAL REFEREE
Case No. NY123-88

Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the Company violated Section
12(B)(3)d when in September 1988 at the JFK
domicile it changed Captain Donovan's duty
free period without his consent?
A hearing was held at the Company offices in Mt. Kisco, New
York on July 28, 1989 at which time Captain Donovan and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared. All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses. Captains Rex A.
Pitts and W. F. McKinney served as the Company members of the
System Board, and Captains Donald H. Brown, Jr. and Eugene F.
Corcoran, Jr., served as the Union members on said Board.

The Oat

of the Board was waived; a stenographic record of the hearing was
taken and both sides filed a post-hearing brief. The Board met
in executive session in St. Louis, Missouri on November 9, 1989.
Section 12(B)(3)d reads in pertinent part:

;

"...when no other reserves are available
for the flight, the Company may change
such duty free period(s) without the pilot's
consent."

!

:

In the instant case, the Company changed Donovan's duty free
period to place him in stand-by status.

What is at issue is

| whether Section 12(B)(3)d can be properly utilized to put the
' affected pilot on "standby."
!

!
i

It is the Union's position that Section 12(B)(3)d is limited
by its terms to place the pilot on or assign him to a particular
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i flight, which, in the Union's view means an assignment involving
i
the actual operation of an airplane. It argues that the phrase
"available for the flight" does not mean an assignment to standby,

i
1

To accomplish the latter, namely to change a duty free per-

! iod for assignment to standby, the Union asserts that the Company
j must resort to Section 12(E)(3) of the contract (i.e. the inversal
|i procedure).

Said Section reads:

"-Inversing Seniority- In the event standby
protection for the operation cannot be provided by a pilot holding a reserve schedule
or by a reserve officer, the Company may assign the most junior pilot in the status required at the domicile who is legal, qualified,
and available to standby duty."
The Union argues that the language of both foregoing
is clear.

Section

Section 12(B)(3)d expressly refers to a "flight" and

12(E)(3) refers expressly to "standby."

Therefore the Union

con-

cludes that 12(B)(3)d cannot be invoked to put the pilot on standby, and that its use for that purpose in Donovan's case was improper and a contractual violation.
The Company's position is simply that the language "availabl
for the flight" in Section 12 (B)(3)d includes and encompasses
"standby" status; is not limited to the actual operation of the
aircraft of a particular flight or an assignment to that operation
and that past practice supports this interpretation and this use
of Section 12(B)(3)d.
I am not prepared to hold that the two disputed contract
Sections are so clear and unambiguous as to be conclusive on their
face. Obviously, if one Section talks of changing a pilot's duty
11
J| free period to make him "available for the flight" and the other
'i talks of the assignment of a pilot "to standby duty," it can be
|: logically and reasonably argued, as does the Union, that they deal
jj

j with different types of assignments and status; 12(B)(3)d to cover
|i the operation of a flight (especially as it refers not

to ci or

any flight but narrowly to "the flight") and 12(E)(3) to the less

-3specific and as yet non-operational

standby status.

Yet, there is logical and reasonable room to interpret the
phrase "available for the flight" to include standby duty, simply
because a pilot on standby is per force "available" to be assigned
to fly a place.

So, there is enough of an ambiguity in Section 12

(B)(3)d to require an interpretation beyond its bare language, eve
juxtaposed with Section 12(E)(3).
However, the Company's evidence of "past practice" is not
determinative in the Company's favor. Though it claimed a regular practice of changing pilot's duty free periods to put them on
standby under Section 12(B)(3)d, it could only identify two such
instances, and could not show convincingly that in those cases,
the duty-free periods were changed involuntarily.

Moreover, two

examples in the year 1985, which apparently did not come to the
Union's attention, do not qualify as a long standing, unvaried
and consistent practice. And it is those latter elements that are
required to establish a past practice which may be used to interprete and define the meaning and application of ambiguous contract
language.
What is determinative in my judgment is the interpretation
and identification the Company assigned to its action at the time
it changed Donovan's duty free period. Its records show and it
notified Donovan that its action was an "inversal." Indeed, for
about twenty days thereafter it made no change in that interpretation or identification.
Frankly, I doubt that the Company would have changed the
basis for its action had Donovan not, after twenty days, asked the
Company to inform him of the "unusual circumstances" justifying
the inversal.

Then the Company notified him that i v ;s action was

not an inversal, but rather under Section 12(B)(3)d.
In the law, there is evidentiary recognition of and credibility accorded "admissions against interest" and "spontaneous

-4exclamations." When the Company at the time it acted, identified
Donovan's duty free period change as an "inversal", that constituted to my mind a constructive "admission against interest"
or "spontaneous exclamation." It meant, as those circumstances
mean, that spontaneously or automatically, the Company thought
and believed that the contract section applicable to its action
was the inversal Section namely 12(E)(3). To my mind that is the
j best evidence of whether the Company, at that critical point,
believed that it could do what it did under a different Section,
|| Section 12(B)(3)d. That it did not then invoke 12(B)(3)d, and did
I j not do so until the factual propriety of the inversal was challeng
is persuasive evidence that it believed Section 12(E)(3) covered
assignments to standby and not Section 12(B)(3)d. And that is how
the ambiguity in Section 12(B)(3)d, if there be an ambiguity,
shall be clarified.
In short, by its own action and identification otherwise, th
i Company may not use Section 12(B)(3)d to change a pilot's duty
i
i free period to place him on standby and thereby it violated Sectio
12(B)(3)d when as a final position, it relied on that Section in
changing Donovan's duty free period without his consent in
September 1988. The remedy is limited as set forth in the Award.

DATED: November 22, 1989

_
Jric /J-ySchme r t z
Neutral Referee

TWA - ALPA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
A i r Line Pilots Association

A W A R D
Case #NY-76-86

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties make the following AWARD:
1. The grievances of the pilots who were
employed in 1978 and 1979; furloughed in
the fall of 1979, and recalled to active
employment in the spring of 1985, that
they have not been properly compensated
in accordance with Sections 4(A)(1), 4
(B)(2), 20(A)(2) and other related sections of the Agreement, is time barred
from arbitration by Section 21(B) of the
Agreement, and hence not arbitrable.

DATED: May 30, 1989
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

W. J. Hillebrand
Concurring

I, W. J. Hillebrand do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Rex A. Pitts
Concurring

I, Rex A. Pitts do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

J. R. Dell Isola
Dissenting

I, J. R. Dell Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED:
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

Fred S. White
Dissenting

I, Fred S. White do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
NOTA BENE:
As this Board has heard the contract issues on the merits,
the Neutral Referee is willing, if acceptable to the parties, and
together with his colleagues on this Board, if they are willing,
to retain jurisdiction on the contract interpretation issues to
hear and decide on the merits like matters which are timely
grieved and filed for arbitration by or on behalf of other pilots
who have been or are subsequently recalled from furlough and who
claim they have not been properly compensated.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of
Flight Attendents
and

President's Grievance
Case No. 89-5008
Commission On
In-Flight
Liquor Sales

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the
proofs and allegations of the above-named Union and Company,
presented on behalf of the Union by its President V. L.
Frankovich, and on behalf of the Company by its Senior Vice
President Employee Relations, J. W. Hoar, make the following
AWARD:
It is hereby ordered that the Company
implement the commission for in-flight
liquor sales referenced in the June 8,
1989 letter of agreement no later than
January 1, 1990.

DATED: December 7, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )ss

Eric T. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed £his instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
)ss . :
)

Karen Lantz
Concurring

I, Karen Lantz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
),S3
)

Nbr'ma Adams
Concurring

I, Norma Adams do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
)
)ss

Sharon Fans
Dissenting

I, Sharon Faris do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
)ss
)'

1 Swaya
issenting

I, Jill Swaya do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument which is my AWARD.

TWA FLIGHT ATTENDANT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independant

Federation of Flight
Attendants

A W A R .D
Case No. 87-0003

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the TWA-Flight Attendant System Board of Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD;
The grievant, Terry Bartee was discharged
for just cause under all the facts and
circumstances of this case.

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: April 9, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

.

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Dirk J. Siedlecki
Concurring
DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

I, Dirk J. Siedlecki do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

Patricia Granger Sutton
Dissenting
DATED: April
STATE OF
OUNTY OF

1989

I, Patricia Granger Sutton do hereby affirm upon my Oath
as Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA FLIGHT ATTENDANT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants

Neutral Referee's
OPINION
AT
nnn*
Case No. 87-0003

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

In accordance with Articles 16 and 17 of the collective
bargaining agreement between the Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants, hereinafter referred to as the "Union," and Trans
World Airlines, Inc., hereinafter referred to as "TWA" or "the
Company," the Undersigned was selected as the neutral referee
of a Board of Adjustment to hear and decide the following issue:
Was the grievant discharged for just cause
under all the facts and circumstances of
this case? And, if not, what shall be the
remedy?
Hearings were held on July 7 and 8 and September 22, 1988,
at which time Mr. Terry Bartee, the grievant, and representatives
of TWA and the Union appeared.

All concerned were afforded full

opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

Mr. Dirk J. Siedlecki served as the TWA

designee on the Board and Ms. Patricia Granger Sutton served as
the Union designee on the Board.
waived.

The Oath of the Arbitrators was

A stenographic record was taken.
The parties submitted post-hearing briefs, and the Board

met in Executive Session on March 7, 1989.
FACTS
Terry Bartee was a TWA flight attendant with seniority
dating from June 24, 1985, sufficient to be a "bid" flight attendant.

He departed from JFK to Paris on November 25, 1986, on a
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pairing consisting of the following schedule: JFK-Paris~CairoBombay-Cairo-Paris-JFK.

The incidents involved in this proceed-

ing took place in Cairo after the return trip from Bombay.

There

was a scheduled layover time in Cairo of forty-nine hours and
thirty-three minutes.

On arrival in Cairo at about 6:00 A.M. on

December 3, 1986, Bartee checked into the Sheraton Heliopolis
Hotel on the outskirts of Cairo.

This was the TWA crew hotel,

and the Company paid for Bartee's stay at the hotel.
Bartee slept for a while and sometime in mid-afternoon
he met Mr. Peter Manzella, a fellow TWA flight attendant who had
arrived in Cairo earlier.
the bazaar.

They ate together and went shopping in

After shopping, they returned to the hotel at about

10:30 or 11:00 P.M. and had dinner together.

Bartee stated he

was unsure whether he had had anything to drink at dinner, but if
he did it must have been a glass of wine.

Manzella testified

that Bartee drank no alcoholic beverage at dinner.
After dinner, they went upstairs to Bartee's room, used
the bathroom, changed clothing and went downstairs to the LeBaron
discotheque which was located in the hotel.

They arrived at the

LeBaron sometime after midnight, on December 4, 1986.

According

to Bartee and Manzella, each ordered a gin and tonic and sat at
the bar and chatted.
The parties are in sharp dispute over what followed.
More importantly, the Company claims that four Egyptian men, while

1. For example and initially the witnesses were in conflict over
the number of people in the disco at the time Bartee was there.
Bartee testified to less than 15 and Manzella to 8~10. The Company witness testified to 100 (Gharib), 100-120 (Soliman) and at
least 20 (Allam).
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in the men's room of the LeBaron, were the objects of Bartee's
unsolicited and somewhat forcible sexual advances.

Bartee denies

that anything of the sort happened.
The Company's evidence concerning the alleged sexual advances consisted primarily of the testimony of Messrs. Ayhman
Gharib and Mohammed Alam, and Mohammed Soliman, the manager or
director of the LeBaron.

Gharib testified that sometime in the

early morning hours of December 4, he encountered Bartee in the
men's room and believed he was drunk.

He testified that Bartee,

with his trousers down to the floor, his hands outstretched and
saying "yes, Y e s 5 " attempted to grab Gharib's penis and came within 15-20

inches from him.

Gharib, saying "no," moved away from

Bartee and quickly left the men's room.

Shortly thereafter, ac-

cording to Gharib, he reported the incident to Soliman.

Gharib

also testified that a smiling Bartee later started to approach him
in the disco, but that Gharib left the area before Bartee reached
him.
Alam testified that he entered the men's room at the
LeBaron and while he was standing at the urinal, Bartee, who was
standing at the adjacent urinal, reached for Alam's penis and
Bartee said "hey man, hey man."

Alam testified he immediately

left the men's room and directly reported the incident to Soliman
who told him to calm down and that he would investigate.
Both Alam and Gharib testified that it was 1% to 2 hours
after they complained that they became aware that Soliman was investigating the events.

Soliman, the disco director, testified

that at about 2:00 A.M., Mr. Tarek Nour Ezzat, a disco patron,
complained that a man tried to grab his penis while he was in the
men's room standing at the urinal.

He identified Bartee as that
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man.

Ezzat did not testify at the hearing.

watch Bartee and the men's room.

Soliman decided to

About twenty minutes later an

Egyptian patron entered the men's room and within a minute was
followed by Bartee.
the men's room.

Soliman then heard an argument coming from

He entered and thereupon found Bartee and the

other patron in an argument.

The other patron complained to

Soliman that Bartee had been looking at the patron's penis and
asking him "immoral things" and complained that he did not expect
such things to happen in a respectable place.
at the time, Bartee denied the accusations.

Soliman said that,

From what he saw and

heard, Soliman concluded that an incident similar to the one described by Ezzat had occurred.

The Egyptian patron, whose name

Soliman could not recall and who did not testify at the hearing,
left shortly thereafter with his fiancee.
According to Soliman, shortly after he left the men's room
he was approached by Alam and then by Gharib, and each asked if
an incident had occurred in the men's room.

(As previously noted,

Alam and Gharib testified that they had complained to Soliman
about two hours earlier).

When Soliman answered in the affirm-

ative, they told him about their encounters with Bartee, each of
them laughing about it with several others joining in the laughter
Alam and Gharib testified that they knew each other and Ezzat only
from seeing each other at the disco; otherwise they had no social
relationship and were not friends with one another.
Bartee testified that he had gone to the men's room three
times and felt as if he was being followed.

Each time someone

else was in the men's room, but he neither spoke nor gestured to
them.

Moreover, neither Alam nor Gharib were the men he saw in

the men's room.

He testified that he told Manzella, "something

-5-

strange—just strange feelings I have, everytime I go the bathroom somebody comes after me."
it also.

Manzella stated he had noticed

Bartee also testified that he "felt a definite sexual

tension or aura emanating" when he went to the men's room and that
on his second trip the the men's room he felt "sexual tension in
the air" because of the length of time the other person was at
the urinal without Bartee "hearing anything."
When Bartee and Manzella decided to leave the disco,
Bartee decided to go the men's room again.
minutes after his last visit.

This was about 30-45

He testified the frequency of his

men's room visits in part was due to an attack of diarrhea attributable to his stay in Bombay, and that despite his acknowledged
discomfort at going to the men's room in the disco, he did not go
to the lavatory in his own room because it was a large hotel and
his room was quite a distance away.
According to Bartee, on this last occasion he entered the
men's room and was accosted by an Egyptian male who asked if he
was an American, and when Bartee acknowledged that he was and that
he worked for TWA, the Egyptian struck him in the face, declaring
that he hated Americans.

Bartee testified that Soliman thereupon

entered the men's room and told Bartee, who was washing blood off
his face, that he, Bartee, would have to leave the disco.
Bartee and Manzella testified that when they tried to report the assault on Bartee to the hotel personnel, they were told
that neither security nor the manager was available, but that they
could speak to the assistant manager.

Upon speaking to the assist-

ant manager, he advised them that he had already received complaints
about Bartee's behavior.

Bartee also was refused details of the

-6-

complaints except that the three disco patrons who by then had
been summoned to the assistant manager's desk mentioned only "bad
behavior."

According to Bartee, when he pointed his assailant out

to the assistant manager, the manager did nothing.
Soliman testified that after he received the complaints
about Bartee, he told Bartee to leave the disco and advised the
night manager of the problems.

Thereafter he, Bartee and Manzella

went to the assistant manager's desk.
they arrived.

Gharib was at the desk when

Soliman then brought Ezzat and Alam to the desk

where the three complainants and Soliman gave written statements.
Bartee testified that the assistant manager advised him
not to get TWA involved.

Nevertheless, Bartee attempted to contact

TWA to tell the Company about the assault on him but was unable to
do so.

The hotel did contact TWA to advise them of the incident

and to complain.

Neither Gharib nor Alam testified that they were

aware that Bartee was employed by TWA and there was no evidence
that TWA or the hotel or its disco had lost any patronage attributable to the alleged incidents. Moreover, there was no evidence that
the matter had become a matter of notoriety beyond the hotel and
TWA.

Within TWA, however, knowledge of the matter had gone beyond

those directly involved due primarily to a "long line" describing
the incident which had been sent by TWA and which may have had
considerable circulation within the Company.
Bartee was discharged by the Company effective January 8,
1987.

A grievance was filed on January 16, 1987, and received by

the Company on January 29, 1987.

A step I hearing was held and

denied by letter dated March 4, 1987.

This Step I hearing was helc

under the interim grievance procedure established by the Company
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and in effect from May, 1986, to February, 1987, as a result of a
work rule change implemented by the Company after the commencement
of the Flight Attendants strike of March 7, 1986.

The Company a-

greed to re-hear some cases after the parties reverted to Article
16 of the collective bargaining agreement, and this grievance was
the subject of a second Step I hearing which also denied the grievance.

The Union filed a Step II appeal which resulted in deadlock

and in this appeal to the Systems Board of Adjustment on August
13,

1987.
The Union contends:
[1] the Company failed to comply with requirements of a fair,

thorough and impartial investigation prior to imposing the sanction of discharge and that the Union improperly was not advised
of the investigation;
[2] even if the facts concerning his conduct was established, Bartee was not subject to Company discipline for his actions because he neither was on~duty at the time of the alleged misconduct nor did the off-duty conduct so affect TWA as to provide
jurisdiction for the Company to discipline him;
[3] the Company failed to sustain its burden of proving
the charges of misconduct by Bartee; and
[4] even if misconduct was proved, under the facts and
circumstances of this case the sanction of discharge (a) is unduly
harsh and (b) constitutes disparate treatment for Bartee when
considered in context with similar disciplinary cases.
The Company disagrees with each of the foregoing Union
contentions.
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1. Fairness of investigation and notification of Union.
The events and proceedings in this matter began during a period
when the flight attendants were involved in a labor dispute.

How-

ever, while the collective bargaining agreement between the Union
and the Company was in dispute as to effectiveness, the Company
instituted a Step I hearing under the agreement, thereby affording the grievant rights under that procedure.

The record demon-

strates that, even if the grievant was prejudiced under the original Step I procedure the prejudice was cured by the rescheduled
Step I hearing, and both parties participated in that procedure,
including Union representation.
Moreover, while it is desirable that information be obtained
first-hand by the Company, the failure to do so did not result in
an investigation which was not fair, thorough and impartial.

Sub-

stantial information was obtained by TWA personnel from the hotel
which had conducted its own investigation and included written
statements by witnesses.

Of course, all of the witnesses adverse

to Bartee were resident in Egypt and, under those particular
circumstances, the Company engaged in a feasible investigation of
the facts which ultimately did not unfairly prejudice the grievant
at the time or for the purposes of this hearing.
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2. Did the grievant's off-duty or on~duty status give the
Company jurisdiction to impose discipline for the alleged misconduct?

Any usual and broad distinctions governing an employer's

right to impose discipline for employee misconduct are based on
whether the employee was on duty or off duty when the alleged misconduct occurred.

In this case, this does not provide an entirely

satisfactory line.
The grievant was on lay-over as previously described and,
in substance, en route during a flight which began at JFK on
November 25, 1986.

At the time of the alleged incidents he was

not on duty in the sense that he was performing duties or had an
obligation to perform duties for the Company.
he was not entirely off-duty either.

On the other hand,

He was staying at a hotel

as a TWA employee, he was identifiable as a TWA employee, his
accommodations were paid for by the Company and he was subject to
worker's compensation and scheduling change.

Those circumstances

created the situation where, at the least, an employee has an
obligation to avoid engaging in conduct which is inconsistent with
regular and customary standards of conduct expected of such employees under circumstances where it is reasonable to expect that
the misconduct in question is practically certain to cause injury
to the business or severe embarrassment to the reputation of the
Company.

This standard may not ultimately define all the limits

of the employee's obligation when on lay-over, but this standard
for employee conduct is sufficient for a decision on the facts of
this case.
For the purposes of this nexus for imposing discipline, th
circumstances established by the record are that if the grievant
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engaged in misconduct of the kind and nature alleged in LeBaron's
which was located in the TWA crew hotel, the conduct would have
occurred in a place where it would practically inevitably cause
TWA serious embarrassment.
suffer serious embarrassment

The facts also show that TWA did
in its relationship with the hotel

which engaged in significant communications concerning the alleged
incident with TWA and it cannot be seriously disputed that it was
public conduct inconsistent with the standard expected of a flight
attendant.

Therefore, if the alleged incidents occurred, TWA had

the authority to discipline the grievant.
3. Did the Company sustain its burden of proving misconduct
by Eartee?

The witnesses were in sharp conflict over what, if

anything, happened at the LeBaron on the morning of December 4,
1986.

Basically the Company claims that four Egyptian men, while

in the men's room of the LeBaron, were the objects of Bartee's
unsolicited and some discernible physical sexual advances.
denies that anything of the sort happened.

Bartee

Obviously, resolving

this dispute requires determining the credibility of the witnesses.
Alam and Gharib testified directly that when Bartee was in
the men's room with them he attempted to grab their penises.

Two

other alleged encounters, the third (with Ezzat) and the fourth
with the unnamed Egyptian, are based almost entirely on hearsay
and standing alone would not be sufficient to sustain the Company's
burden.

However, they do not stand alone, considering the direct

testimony of Alam, Gharib and Soliman.
Alam, Gharib and Soliman testified directly that there was
a commotion in the men's room with respect to the fourth alleged
incident.

Although evidence of the sexual aspect of that fourth

encounter is essentially hearsay, evidence that something happened
which caused a commotion is not hearsay.

Soliman's testimony that

he saw Bartee enter the men's room after the Egyptian had entered
it and that the argument and commotion followed, plus the testimony

-11concerning the appearance and demeanor of the Egyptian when
Soliman entered the men's room, all of which followed Soliman's
observation of the men's room because of the complaint from Ezzat
concerning a sexual encounter, further support the claim there
was a pattern of sexual advances on those men by Bartee.
Moreover, the testimony of Soliman concerning the hearsay
statements of Ezzat and the other Egyptian may well involve exceptions to the hearsay rule as excited utterances or reports of
present sense impressions.

Taking account of the other two in-

cidents and the facts surrounding the third and fourth incidents,
the record supports the conclusion that the third and fourth
alleged sexual encounters occurred based on the circumstances,
the exceptions to the hearsay rule and proof of a pattern of
conduct.
Bartee denies that any incident occurred and claims there
was an anti-American episode on-the fourth alleged incident. To
credit Bartee's denial and thereby reject the substance of Alam's,
Gharib's and Soliman's testimony requires concluding that the
latter three were lying and in league to hurt Bartee.

Other than

the fact they did testify against Bartee there was no eivdence
that they were involved in a conspiracy.

Indeed, if they were

conspiring their stories probably would not have included such
matters as their laughter at the incidents and admissions that
they were not expecting to be called as witnesses.

Nor, if they

conspired, would their direct testimony have included some inconsistency on the times involved and the sequence of events.

More-

over, the only motive offered by the Union for believing there
was a conspiracy is a claim of Egyptian anti-Americanism and Arab
or Moslem antipathy to homosexuals.

While there might well be
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anti-Amerlean feelings among Egyptians, there was no evidence that
these witnesses shared those feelings at all or so strongly that
they would engage in this kind of conspiracy that extended from
Cairo all the way to the arbitration in the United States.

It

would be wholly improper to disbelieve an Egyptian national simply
because he is an Egyptian national testifying adversely to an
American who also is homosexual.

Basically I accept their testi-

mony in the critical areas as accurate, the less important inconsistencies notwithstanding.
Bartee did testify that the fourth incident involved an
anti-American incident with an Egyptian male in the men's room.
This story, probably is true only in part.

If there was an "anti-

American" response by the Egyptian male, it likely was a consequence of some provocation, and considering the evidence it is
not mere speculation to contemplate Bartee provoked it.
Rarely an easy task, the difficulty of determining the
credibility of witnesses in this case was magnified, because the
witnesses for the Company testified through an interpreter, making
personal observation of demeanor and choice of language less of
a factor in resolving their credibility than if they had testified
directly in English.

These problems were not present in assess-

ing Bartee's credibility.
However, it is not on his demeanor that I reject Bartee's
denials.

Rather it is based first, on the direct testimony of

those witnesses who have no interest in the outcome of this proceeding and the corroborating aspects of their testimony.

And,

second is Bartee's failure to effectively report to TWA concerning his own claimed injuries, or offer any medical or other proof
of that injury.
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Third, there are significant and unusual facts provided by
Bartee which give credence to the Company's witnesses and support
rejection of Bartee's denials.

He did admit that he made several

trips to the LeBaron men's room because he was in discomfort.
The reason he gave for going to the LeBaron's men's room instead
of going to the lavatory in his own room in the hotel is just not
plausible.

Moreover, he admitted that he continued to go to the

LeBaron's men's room despite his admission that he felt that men
were following him and that he felt "sexual tensions in the air"
when other men were present in the LeBaron's men's room.

These

factors, together with the other evidence, support the conclusion
that there were sexual motives for his going to the men's room.
Indeed, if the facts were limited to Bartee's description, namely
an assault on him, I fail to see where "sexual tensions" were involved or why Bartee had any reason to sense external sexual tensions.

Rather, the logical explanation is that the sexual tensions

had to be Bartee's alone, and his tensions or arousement led to
his conduct as described by Company witnesses.
It is important to note that Bartee was not discharged because he is a homosexual.

The Company does not object to homo-

sexual activity by consenting adults, in private, while on layover status.

What it does object to, is his unsolicited, unwel-

comed and forced homosexual advances to strangers in a public men's
room.

I am satisfied that the Company would object and act simil-

arly in the

circumstance of a forced, unsolicited and unwelcomed

heterosexual advances.
Fourth, Bartee's prior record of conduct impeaches his
testimony by impugning his capacity to testify truthfully.

His

prior record which consists of issuing checks with insufficient

-14funds and misrepresentation on his employment application goes
directly to his capacity to testify truthfully.
4.

Was the sanction of discharge proper?

Under the fore-

going circumstances, I do not find the Company's discharge of the
grievant to be so harsh or inappropriately unresponsive to the
offense as to require or permit me to set it aside and to substitute a different sanction even if I thought a lesser penalty would
have been sufficient.

A flight attendant deals with the public.

Considering the public aspects of the grievant's conduct, and the
embarrassment to TWA, I do not think it unfair or unreasonable if
the Company concluded that Bartee's conduct in a public men's
room made him unsuitable to deal with passengers and fatally impaired his future effectiveness and usefulness as a flight attendant working with other employees.

Though the Company does not make

this point specifically, it is obviously implicit.

The long line

report was unfortunate and possibly unnecessary but Bartee must
share responsibility for it.

It would not have been generated

but for his conduct.
The final question is whether the discharge of the grievant
constitutes unequal or unfair treatment of this grievant when compared to the discipline of other employees.

The parties have cited

a number of disciplinary cases to support their opposing positions
on this issue.

Those cases which involve voluntary sexual conduct

by both participants are, in my view, distinguishable from the
circumstances of this case.
But two cases have a direct bearing on this question of
discriminatory discipline.

Clivs DiSusa (January, 1983)

(Union

Exhibit No. 8) involved a male Service Manager, who while on duty
and in full public view grabbed a female passenger and kissed her
against her will as she was deplaning, thereby causing serious
offense to the passenger and embarrassment to TWA.
pended without pay for seven days.

He was sus-

In 1982, TWA discharged Clifford
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Jones, a male flight attendant who forced his sexual attentions
on an unwilling female flight attendant.
Limited to single cases neither can be said to have established a policy or a pattern for every ensuing case solely on the
basis that it involved unwanted and uninvited sexual advances.
TWA's discharge of Bartee is consistent with the sanction imposed
on Jones and may be inconsistent with DiSusa.

However, without

facts concerning the employment background of each, conclusions
concerning

the consistency of the sanction are difficult to assess

Moreover, a single case (i.e. DiSusa) is not enough to establish
a pattern or practice, which would make the Bartee penalty disparate or discriminatory.
The few commendations Bartee received for good work on
several occasions are not sufficient to outweigh the negative
aspects of his record, including the current charges.
In summary, I conclude:
1.

there was no prejudice to the grievant attributable

to the Company's conduct of the investigation or the manner in
which the Step I hearing was conducted;
2.

the misconduct, if engaged in while the grievant was

on lay-over, was of such a kind and nature and engaged in under
such circumstances that it was practically certain it would and,
in fact, did cause serious embarrassment to TWA, and was contrary
to standards of conduct reasonably expected of flight attendants.
3.

the Company sustained its burden of proving by clear

and convincing evidence that Bartee engaged in the misconduct with
which he was charged while on lay-over;
4.

the discharge of the grievant was neither arbitrary,

unreasonable or unduly harsh nor did it constitute discriminatory
treatment of the grievant.

DATED: April 9, 1989

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

TWA - IFFA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants

A W A R D '
Case No. 86-0169

and

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties make the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the discharge of
Judith Fields-Leduc.

Eric A.Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: April 27, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ' '
I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
^^^^^cxx^X^xl1^
John
Contmrr ing
DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

I, John Nelson do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

^

'Jane Heff linger
Dissenting
DATED: April
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

/

1989

I, Jane Hefflinger do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - IFFA SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants

OPINION OF NEUTRAL REFEREE
Case No. 86-0169

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Judith Fields-Leduc? If not, what shall
be the remedy?
Hearings were held on November 10 and November 11, 1988, at
which time Mrs. Fields-Leduc, hereinafter referred to as the
"grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to

offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine
witnesses.

The Oath of the System Board of Adjustment was waived.

Ms. Jane Hefflinger served as the Union's designee on the Board of
Adjustment and Mr. John Nelson served as the Employer's designee
on said Board.

The Undersigned was selected as the neutral

referee.
Each side filed a post-hearing brief, and the Board met in
executive session on April 5, 1989.
The grievant was discharged for "strike violence."

I find

that she was willfully involved in acts constituting "strike violence" and that those acts were sufficiently serious to justify her
discharge.
Let me come right to the point.

The grievant's version of

the critical events is so highly implausible and illogical as to
lack credibility.

When the contrary testimony of eye witnesses
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innocently involved in the events is factored in, the grievant's
version not only becomes .unbelievable but the Employer's case
against the grievant achieves the "clear and convincing" level
required to sustain a discharge.
Certain aspects of the incident and events are not disputed.
On April 8, 1986, as four non-striking

flight attendants were

walking in street clothes from the Lexington Hotel on 48th Street
in Manhattan

towards a restaurant, they were suddenly and intensel

chased by a group of strikers or strike supporters.

The pursuers

jeered them loudly, using angry, insulting and profane language,
and pelted them with raw eggs.

Frightened, the four attendants

fled in different directions.

Some took refuge in a nearby store

and an apartment lobby.

The grievant was with the pursuers, was

part of the chase, and was prominently engaged in directing invectives and insulting language at the non-strikers.
What is denied, and what is in dispute is whether the grievant joined in the egg throwing, - more specifically whether she
"cracked" an egg on the head of one of the four attendants (Barbar
Williams Bellows) and whether she violently grabbed another attend
ant (Diane Stevens) by the shoulder from behind with apparent intent to assault her.
The Employer also charges that the grievant "stood by and
watched as a male flight attendant (a striker) attempted to kick
Bellows' and "raised her fists against Bellows and tried to strike
her."
The grievant's explanation is that she was on her.way home
near the Lexington Hotel; that she decided to check on any picket
line there (in her capacity as a strike captain who briefed pickets) and came upon that location as the chase began or was in progress.

She became emotionally caught up in the events and joined

the chase.

She does not: deny that she jeered at the four
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attendants, calling them "scabs" and accused them of "taking jobs"
from the strikers.

However she denies that she threw eggs, or

smashed an egg on the head of one of the attendants, or committed
any other acts or threats of violence.
someone

Rather, she claims that

(unidentified) ran past her and placed an egg in her hand.

But that she immediately disposed of it by throwing it directly
onto the sidewalk.
I think it unlikely

in the extreme for the grievant

to have

refrained from egg throwing and from physically grabbing one of
the attendants when she had joined in all the other acts and event
of the chase.

Indeed, she was so emotionally caught up in the

events and obviously so angry with the non-strikers, that she
followed two of them into an apartment lobby where they had sought
refuge, and verbally berated them there.

I simply do not believe

that she "stopped at the water's edge" and did not join in the egg
throwing.

Such restraint, considering her acknowledged anger and

participation in the chase, would have been unrealistic and unnatural, and I do not accept it as fact.
This disbelief on my part becomes conclusive when the advers^
testimony of some or all of the non-strikers

is considered.

All

four testified that they saw the grievant in the group that threw
eggs.

Linda Ross testified that she saw the grievant strike

Bellows on the back of her head.

It is undisputed that Bellow's

head and hair were splattered with raw egg, and I conclude that
that resulted from the witnessed assault by the grievant.

I find

no reason to disbelieve what Ross testified she saw.
Similarly, again considering the manifest improbability of
the grievant participating in some of the frightening and threatening events but not in egg throwing, I find no reason to disbelieve Diane Itier who testified that the grievant grabbed her
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shoulder and believed the grievant was trying to hit her.
The balance of the events, and the allegations related there
to, such as what the grievants and others did just before the
police arrived and in the presence of the police, and whether at
certain points the grievant ran across the street or simply walked
do not change my foregoing findings of fact and conclusions.
such I find it unnecessary

As

to decide the other allegations of

physical violence or whether the grievant entered a guilty plea
in court to the assault charges.
There are two remaining questions.
acts constitute strike violence warranting

First, did the grievant 1
discharge.

And second,

was her penalty too severe and disparate when compared with other
cases in which lesser penalties were imposed.
It must be noted that the chase and the attack on the four
non-striking attendants took place on a New York City street, away
from a strike location, under circumstances when the attendants
were not in uniform and not crossing a picket line, but off duty
or on layover on the way to a restaurant for dinner.

Under that

circumstance, the chase and attack had to be planned; the nonstriking attendants had to be previously identified and probably
observed in their movements to and from the Lexington Hotel.

The

chase and the assault with eggs had to be especially frightening
to the four attendants considering its suddeness, unexpectedness,
vehemence and locale.

It is immaterial whether the grievant part-

icipated in the planning phase.

Her willing and unreserved parti-

cipation made her an accessory at least.

By any definition or

standard, I must conclude that she and the others (unidentified
in this record) who engaged in the chase and egg assault committed
acts of strike violence, and that what she did was serious enough
to warrant discharge.

-5I feel compelled to stateat this point that I believe I
understand the anger and frustration of strikers when they see
replacements or non-strikers work in their place.

Any ideological

sympathy I may have personally, cannot extend as an arbitrator to
excuse violence.

As a matter of law, contract interpretation and

the well settled principles of labor relations, strike violence is
proscribed and actionable and grounds for discipline, including
discharge.

It is to the law, the contract and those principles

that the arbitrator is bound.
Finally, I do not find that her discharge was disparate
treatment or discriminatory.

The Union cites the case of Uli

Derekson, a purser who struck a picketing flight attendant with
her car as she crossed the picket line, and was not disciplined,
and the case of Peter Washington who was suspended thirty days
for turning a fire extinguisher on and into the face of a picket.
As reprehensible as those two actions were, they are significantly
distinguishable from the case at hand.
taneous, albeit violent, reactions.
Washington reacted to a racial slur.

Both were unplanned, spon-

There is some indication that
The full facts of the

Derekson situation could not be directly testified to with probative value.

But neither had the elements of the circumstances

of the present case.

In the grievant's case, the acts were not

spontaneous or momentary.

Rather, even if not planned, they were

carried on over a period of time, and took on the calculated objective of frightening, punishing, intimidating and possibly injuring the non-strikers.

It did not take place, as did the two

cases cited, at a picket line or at a strike location.

Nor can

it be considered "normal" strike activity or even a provoked response to replacements or non-strikers at a struck locale.

Nor

does it fit into activity designed to peacefully persuade workers
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not to cross a picket line or to persuade the public not to patronize the struck establishment.
Unlike Washington and Derekson, the grievant had plenty of
time to think through what she was doing.

Even if first caught

up in the emotions of the events, there came a point during the
chase when she could and should have stopped and withdrawn without
further participation.

Her continued presence and participation

cannot be interpreted as a spontaneous and momentarily

irrational

act, but became part of a planned and possibly premeditated action
when she voluntarily continued to be part of it.

In short, she

became a willing and knowing participant when she had a chance to
and should have stopped that participation.

Even if it started as

an instantaneous and unthinking reaction to non-strikers who had
taken her job, she knowingly

permitted it to go too far and too

long to the point of wrongfulness and illegality.
can be held

For that she

responsible.

-T^r

DATED: April 27, 1989

—f,

Eric J/ Schmertz
Neutral Referee
/

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants

A W A R D
Case No. 88-495

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
1.

There was not just cause for the discharge of Kenneth Hooper.

2.

He shall be reinstated.

3.

His reinstatement shall be without back
pay, and the period of time from his discharge to his reinstatement shall be deemed
a disciplinary suspension for rule violations relating to failure to properly perform his duties and responsibilities as a
Flight Service Manager.

DATED: December 4, 1989
STATE OF New York)ss
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric 3/. Schmertz
Neutixal Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Susan Lantz
Concurring in #1 Above
Concurring in #2 Above
(Concurr ing )(j5is sent
From #3 Above

I, Susan Lantz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: December
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
M. Scott
&
Assenting From #1 Above
Dissent_ing From #2 Above
( Pis sen ting)
Above
From

I, Diane M. Scott do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS' SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants
and

OPINION
of
Neutral Referee
Case No. 88-495

Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The issue is:
Whether there was just cause for the discharge of Kenneth Hooper and if not, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held on September 27 and September 28, 1989
in New York City, at which time Mr. Hooper, hereinafter referred
to as the "grievant" and representatives of the above-named Union
and Company appeared. Additionally, the'grievant was represented
by private counsel of his choosing. All concerned were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine

witnesses.

The System Board of Adjustment consisted of Ms. Susan Lantz,
Union designee; Ms. Diane M. Scott, Company designee, and the
Undersigned Neutral Referee.

The Oath of the Board was waived.

The Board met in executive session on October 19, 1989.
The basis for the grievant's discharge and the charge agains
him is stated in the letter dated December 28, 1988 from Mr. Donal
Fleming, Regional Manager In-Flight Services, to the grievant.
In pertinent part it reads:
"...as a result of an in-flight revenue and
procedure audit performed on Flight 701/12
October 1988 you are charged with submitting untruthful information for (or on)
Company documents, failure to safeguard Company property, theft of Company funds and

-2failure to follow accounting and revenue
control procedures."
In short, and based on the Company's evidence and testimony
adduced at the hearing, the grievant is charged primarily with
both theft of Company revenue and merchandise and with submitting
willfully untrue reports, in connection with transactions involving the sale of liquor, duty free products and the rental of headsets.

And he is charged incidentally with violations of certain

general Rules of Conduct.
The Company freely states that prior to the events giving
rise to this case, it suspected the grievant of committing prior
thefts. Though it did not previously charged him with theft or
the submission of fraudulent reports, it twice disciplined him
(by counseling and then with a fifteen day suspension) "for related revenue account discrepancies and loss of funds."
The Company also admits that because of its suspicions it
made the grievant a "target" of an investigative procedure and
surveillance of his work as the Flight Service Manager on Flight
701 from London to New York on October 12, 1988.
The investigation took the form first of "sterilization" of
the plane just before it left London. Sterilization involved the
taking of an inventory of the headsets aboard, the quantity and
types of alcoholic beverages, and the quantity and type of merchandise for duty-free sale. Then, upon arrival in New York, and
under what the Company says were controlled and secure procedure's,
i an inventory of those items were taken, revenue produced from the
sales checked against the headsets used and not used, the liquor
and duty-free items that remained, and against the sales and
revenue reports submitted by the grievant.
It is undisputed that under Company rules, the Flight Service
Manager is responsible for the accurate completion of all In-Fligh
Revenue papers and the safeguarding of all Company revenue produced from in-flight sales.
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It is the Company's position that the inventories and audits
showed the following discrepancies:
Head Sets
a) Hooper reported seventy-six (76) headsets sold when actually ninety (90)
were sold or reissued.
Total Dollar Variance 90 x $4.00 = $360.00
76 x $4.00 = $304.00
Revenue Short
b)

= $ 56.00

Hooper reported that $262.50 was deposited.
Only $255.50 was deposited.
Revenue Short
TOTAL REVENUE SHORT

= $

6.50

= $ 62.50

Duty Free
a) Hooper failed to account for the following
Revenue for:
1.
2.
3.
4.

1
1
1
1

bottle of Chivas Regal
Anais Anais
Helena Rubenstein Make-up
Noisome Creme

TOTAL REVENUE SHORT
Liquor
a)

b)

= $
16.00
=
24.00
kit 29.00
=
28.00
$ 132.00
= $ 132.00

Hooper failed to accurately account for inflight beverage coupons for a loss of revenue equalling
$
1.00
Ten (10) marked Ambassador miniatures were
found in coach carts. Each miniature costs
$2.50.
Total revenue lost

$ 25.00

c)

Hooper stated deposit was $321.00, while in
fact only $320.00 was deposited.
Revenue lost
$ 1.00

d)

Failure to accurately report final inventory
of coach liquor carts. The audit revealed a
shortage of:
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1 Miniature

$

1 Wine

2.50
2.50

TOTAL REVENUE SHORT

$ 32.00

Again, repeating the Company's primary accusation against
the grievant, I quote from the testimony of Mark Moscicki the
Company's Supervisor of In-Flight Operations, and the one who
made the decision to discharge the grievant.
The Neutral Referee asked him if the Company was claiming
that the grievant "stole" the $134 that represented the discrepancy in duty-free sales.

He responded "yes."

He also testified

that the grievant's dismissal was based "on the charge of theft
and other charges..." and that "theft is a terminable offense not
requiring progressive discipline."

Making it clear that although

the grievant was also charged with certain rule violations, the
ultimate penalty of discharge was imposed because the Company
concluded he "stole" revenue, and that that act was "the straw
that broke the back."
I agree with the Company that theft is a summary dischargeable offense. From the record it is clear to me that if the Company did not believe that he stole revenue, the case would not
have been "pushed over" to the point of discharge.

Therefore as

to whether the discharge is to be upheld or reversed turns on
whether theft has been proved by the requisite standard of proof.
As the grievant is not officially charged with a crime (as
that cannot be done in an arbitration), nonetheless the charge of
theft parallels the criminal charge of theft. And though the
grievant's liberty is not in jeopardy in this proceeding, his
reputation and future employability certainly are.

Therefore,

though the criminal standard of proof of beyond a reasonable doubt
is not applicable here, it has been

my consistent view and hold-

ing that under these circumstances the applicable standard of

-5"clear and convincing evidence" of the offense charged must be
rigidly and uncompromisingly met for the charge of theft to be
upheld.

And, as the parties well know, the burden of satisfying

that standard is on the Company.
The Company has raised some very serious suspicions about
the grievant's conduct, especially when viewed against the backdrop of a prior record of revenue "losses" and other irregularities. Considering that prior record, I understand why the Compan
became suspicious; why it apparently doubted that the prior "losse
and irregularities were simply errors or poor duty performance;
why it decided to make the grievant a "target" and to try to catch
him committing theft and fraud; and why it audited and inventoried
the flight. Indeed, I have no quarrel with what the Company did
because it has the right to protect the merchandise it distributes
and sells aboard a flight and the revenue therefrom, and to uncove
the dishonesty of an employee.
I have studied this record very carefully, including excellent written summations of the facts and argument submitted to me
at my request by my colleagues on the System Board, and I have
concluded that the circumstantial evidence adduced and relied on
by the Company falls short of the requisite "clear and convincing"
standard.
There is no direct evidence that the grievant stole money
or goods. No one saw him do any such thing or even physically
act in a manner on which any such reasonable conclusion could be
j based.

He made no_ "admissions against interest," no

"spontaneous

declarations" or even suspicious or compromising remarks which
could point in that direction.

Upon arrival in New York, he was

immediately confronted by Company investigators and was subject to
questioning.

Yet he made no statements that could be deemed in-

criminating. Importantly, the Company searched his flight bag
and found nothing. His person was casually searched, and it was
possible for the Company to have searched him extensively then.
Nothing was found.

His wallet was "looked into," but no demand

-6was made on him to account for the money he had in the wallet, anc
there is no evidence that any of it was stolen.
It is well settled that in the absence of direct evidence
a discharge offense, including one that parallels a crime, may be
proved by circumstantial evidence.
But if a case is sustained on circumstantial evidence, the
quantum of proof is met only if that evidence is of such quality,
quantity, and coincidence that only one logical and reasonable
explanation or conclusion can be drawn - and that is that there
are no acceptable possibilities other than that the offense was
committed.
If there are other reasonable, realistically possible
and hence believable explanations, even if not equally persuasive,
to account for the events, the conclusion of culpability should
not be made, because the evidence of guilt, in that case, would
fall short of "clear and convincing."
The Company's circumstantial case against the grievant is
first grounded on the accuracy of the "sterilization" of the fligh
before it left London. If there were errors at that time in the
i j count of of headsets or liquor, for example, that would throw off
I and make inaccurate the audit conducted in New York. And if so,
j that could reasonably account for discrepancies between the headj| sets and liquor which the Company asserts was sold (or missing
and presumably sold) and the shortfall in revenues reported and/or
turned in.
I am not prepared to find conclusively, on the basis of .__
clear and convincing evidence, that the "sterilization" was absolutely accurate. For example, there is testimony that headsets
are stored in quantity in bags, and that the bags are supposed to
contain a specific number of sets. There is evidence that in the
original count the Company assumed the accuracy of the quantity
supposed to be in each bag, but may not have checked that quantity
individually. And that at times a lesser or greater number of
sets are stored in one bag than officially called for.

Frankly, while it is improbable that the sterilization was
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inaccurate, I am not prepared to conclude, based on this record
before me, that that was not a reasonable possibility.

For at

least relatively minor errors in the original count of headsets,
liquor, and even duty-free sale items could explain the discrepancies in numbers and moneys when these items were audited in
New York.
Also, the grievant was not the only employee who made headset, liquor and duty-free sales on the flight. Cabin Attendants
did so too. I think it a reasonable possibility (because I have
personally experienced it) that Attendants may have given out some
headsets free that should have been sold (in the Coach section);
may have given liquor miniatures and/or bottles free that should
have been sold, (again in the Coach section) or co-mingled them
between the First and Ambassador classes where they are free, and
the Coach section, where they are to be sold; may have erred in
the sale of duty-free merchandise or negligently misplaced items
or failed to collect for items sold; and may have made errors in
their sales and use report to the grievant and in the amounts of
money they collected and turned over to him.
That circumstances causing any of these possibilities^or
their actual occurrences are to be noted on the official reports
(referred to by the Company as the "safety net") and were not so
noted means only that the grievant failed to carry out his supervisory duties properly and was negligent, careless or indifferent.
But it does not mean convincingly, that he stole money or merchandise or willfully adjusted the report to hide or obfuscate any
such misconduct.
The duty-free merchandise that was allegedly missing and
presumably sold, but for which there is a significant monetary
short fall, presents special circumstances. These items when
available for sale, like liquor or headsets, are within the
custody, control or proximity of others beside the grievant.

I

think it reasonably possible that someone else, another employee
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| or a passenger may have taken them without making payment.

The

grievant testified that he was away from the duty-free cart once
or twice during the flight, including one time because of a passi enger fist fight. This was not refuted by others aboard. No one
else was searched or apprehended and therefore could have left
the plane with the merchandise, undetected.
Also, as previously noted, is it not possible or reasonably
possible, that some duty-free items were "sold" for later payment
before the plane arrived, and that with other matters pressing,
the purchaser forgot to pay and was not followed up? Or, payment was improperly converted by someone else, and the grievant
negligently made out inaccurate reports.

I find nothing in the

contract or the Company Rules that makes the grievant an absolute
guarantor of the accuracy of what was reported to him by the Cabin
Attendants or absolutely responsible for monetary errors made by
others under his supervision, where as here, the charge is not jus
negligence, carelessness or incompetence, but rather fraud and
theft.
An examination of some of his reports shows errors that I
think he would not have recorded had he wanted to cover up or not
call attention to his actions. For example, he reported the deposit of $262.50 for headsets sold, but only
deposited.

$255.50 was in fact

To avoid calling attention to that money discrepancy

why would he not have reported $255.50 so that the report correlated with the money on hand?
He reported a deposit of $321 on a liquor accounting, when
only $320 was turned in.

Why would he have not tried to hide this

discrepancy if he pocketed the difference?
I recognize that minor discrepancies of the foregoing type
could have been made purposefully, to cover-up or divert attention
from larger, but not recorded monetary discrepancies from, for example, duty-free sales. But as both conclusions are, I believe,
reasonable possibilities, I cannot find convincingly

that his

-9reports were willfully false.
But I wish to be blunt.

I do not conclude that the grievant

did not steal and did not make out fraudulent reports. Like the
Company, I am suspicious, not only from the facts in this case but
also by viewing them against the backdrop of a prior record of
revenue losses, passing bad checks, and cocaine use. These things
could well be reasons for a need for money and could induce theft.
As an employee for some 15% years and as an experienced Flight
Service Manager he cannot persuasively assert that he did not knov
how to properly fill out revenue and sales reports or the importance of their accuracy, especially for Customs. Speculatively,
therefore, theft may be an answer to his administrative errors.
Also, there are questions in my mind about his forthrightness as a
witness. But I am unable to elevate my suspicions, speculations
and questions to the requisite probative or evidentiary level that
would transform the Company's otherwise equivocal circumstantial
case to one that is clear and convincing. Suspicions, unanswered
questions, uneasy demeanor, and speculative conclusions, are simp]
not enough, where, as here, a heavy burden of proof is on the Company. Yet I do conclude that he made inaccurate and incomplete re
ports, contrary to his responsibilities and he has no acceptable
excuse for those ommissions.
Though I shall order the grievant's reinstatement, it shall be
without back pay, and the period between his discharge and reinstatement shall be a disciplinary suspension for negligence, carelessness and inattention to his responsibilities "to make accurate
reports." He has been disciplined previously for these failings.
But as the main charge of theft has not been proved, a further
suspension for poor work performance and for violations of administrative and operating rules, is the appropriate penalty at this
point.
In short, I am giving the grievant the benefit of the doubt.
But if revenue losses and other such irregularities continue to
occur on flights on which he works, I would deem that to create
a rebuttable presumption that he was engaged in misconduct of the
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type charged in this proceeding.

In that event, and also because

it would be an inexcusable continuation of poor work performance
and rule violations, the Company would not be confronted with the
same rigid standard of proof.

Instead, the burden would be on the

grievant to rebut the presumption.

Ericr J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee
DATED: December 4, 1989

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants

A W A R D
Cases 88-30 and 88-213

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The disciplinary letter, the fifteen (15)
day suspension and the discharge given to
and imposed on Gaines Salvant were not for
just cause. He shall be reinstated with
full back pay and benefits.

DATED: October 16, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) °'

Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Norma Adams
Concurring

I, Norma Adams do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this
instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: October
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Dirk J. Siedlecki
Dissenting

I, Dirk J. Siedlecki do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Independent Federation of Flight
Attendants

OPINION OF NEUTRAL REFEREE
Cases 88-30 and 88-213

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.

The issues are:
[1]

Whether there was just cause for the
15 day suspension of Gaines Salvant,
and the disciplinary letter placed in
his file, and if not what shall be
the remedy?

[2]

Whether there was just cause for the
discharge of Gaines Salvant, and if not
what shall be the remedy?

A hearing was held on May 24, 1989 at which time Mr. Salvant
hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of
the above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were

afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. Ms. Norma Adams and Mr. Dirk
J. Siedlicki served respectively as the Union and Company arbitrators on the System Board, and the Undersigned was selected and
served as the Neutral Referee.

The Oath of the Board was waived.

The grievant was first suspended and later discharged becaus
he reached those sequential points in the Company's progressive
discipline policy for "No Shows" for flight assignments.
Significant in this case is the fact that the grievant was
not suspended and discharged under the generally accepted principles and disciplinary grounds for unsatisfactory attendance or
absenteeism, but rather, as acknowledged by the Company, for violations of a specific policy relating to and designed to control
and discipline for failure to protect flight assignment (i.e. "No
Shows").

-2Therefore the propriety of the discipline imposed on the
grievant in this case turns on whether in fact, he violated the
specific "No Show" policy and whether that policy was enforceable
and binding on him.
If the latter part of that question is answered
tive an

in the nega-

answer to the first part is immaterial.

If there is any well settled rule in industrial relations,
which is uniformly and consistently recognized and applied by
arbitrators, it is the rule on the effectiveness and enforceabilit
of policies resulting in employee discipline.

This is compelling-

ly so when the policy contains a specific step by step progression
of increasingly severe discipline, resulting, at specific points,
in the more severe penalties of suspension and discharge. The
conditions for liability and enforceability are universely recognized. They are:
That the policy and procedures reasonably relate to the jobs affected and to the performance of those jobs;
That the measures of discipline be reasonable
for the offenses;
That the policy or work rule be made known to
the covered work force by adequate notices,
postings, distribution or other dissemination;
That the policy or rule be evenhandedly and
consistently applied to all employees similarly situated.
All of these standards must be present and complied with
for the policy to be enforceable for discipline.
In this matter, the policy is clearly reasonable.

To ensure

the reliability of the Company's flight schedule, flight attendants are expected, properly, to meet their flight assignments,
and a record of "No Shows" need not be tolerated.
A review of the policy, with its points of warnings, letters

-3of discipline and suspension and finally discharge, shows a relation of reasonableness between the offenses and their cumulative
nature, and the levels of discipline imposed.
In this matter, there is, however, some evidence of disparate treatment, at least procedurally, in the application of the
steps and sequence of the "No Show" policy, between the grievant
and one or two other employees, similarly situated, to the grievant s disadvantage. And on the question of whether he committed
all the violations alleged, there are grounds to consider whether
one of the grievant's "No Shows" (the flight assignment on which
he was "balanced") should have been charged against him because
he may not have been properly notified and did not "okay" that
assignment.
But I need not decide those last two factors because I have
concluded that a different essential requirement for the enforceability of the Company's policy has not been met.
The Company acknowledges that it did not notify its employee^
of the policy nor of its specific formula for discipline. It also
did not officially notify the Union of the policy or its implement
ation.
Indeed, the Union learned of it accidentally.

The Company

admits that the details of the policy were for the internal information of management and as a guide to management for the imposition of discipline in "No-Show" cases.
This is not to say that the grievant was not told, through
counseling and warnings, that he was subject to further discipline
and that his job was in jeopardy. Rather, it is to say that he
was not put on notice of the precise sequence of steps and the
number and frequency of "No Shows" that would mechanically result
not just in the application of discipline, but, critically, the
point at which he would be suspended and discharged.
The Company's "No Show" policy is exact, as follows:

-4No Show Offense

Disciplinary Action Range

1st
2nd
3rd
4th

Letter of Warning
5-10 days removal from payroll
10-15 days removal from payroll
Termination (In some instances,
a 30 day removal might be
appropriate.)

Where, as here, the policy is so exact and progressively
inexorable, the employee is entitled to know, with similar precision and exactness, where he stands and what will next happen.
The reasons that he is entitled to that notice are also well
known.

Disciplinary programs and policies are not limited to the

imposition of penalties.

Also, they are designed and intended to

rehabilitate and save the employee from further discipline by
changing his record and raising his performance to a satisfactorylevel. By warning of specific consequences, step by step, of
failure and continuing failure to work to a satisfactory level,
the employee is given a fair chance to remedy his wrongs. This
latter rehabilitative purpose is frustrated, or at least impeded,
if the policy is not well publicized to the work force.
Absent that notification, it remains solely punitive and
that is not enough to justify it, even if the penalties are reason<able and evenhanded.
Also, in my view, the notice requirement extends also to
the employee's bargaining agent. That the Company did not inform
the Union was a failure of the purposes of notice. Obviously,
discipline of its members is an important matter to the Union, not
just so that the Union can represent and defend its member, but so
that the Union can provide advice and counsel and assist the member towards rehabilitation. If the Union is not a "partner" with
the Company in gaining employee compliance with rules and policies
it certainly has a legitimate part to play in helping its member
improve conduct and performance, thereby making discipline or
further discipline unnecessary.

And both the Company and the

-5Union should want that result. Not to notify the Union, and give
it a chance to participate is to make that result which is one of
the reasons for a discipline policy - all the more difficult.
For the reasons stated, this flaw is enough to procedurally
negate the discipline imposed on the grievant. I make no determinations on the grievant's "No Show" record or how or where it
would have fit in the Company's
been enforceable.

"No Show" policy, had that policy

DATED: October 16, 1989
Eric J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

TWA PILOT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

A W A R D
Case #NY-130-87
#NY-147-87

Trans World Airlines

The Undersigned, duly constituted as the System Board of
Adjustment, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of
the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
The Company violated Section 5J of the
contract by using bid crews rather than
reserve pilots to protect ferry flights
5051 and 5065 respectively on October 18
and November 4, 1987.
The Company shall cease and desist from
using bid crews under such circumstances
in the future and shall instead use reserve pilots available under the provisions
of Section 12(D)(2) of the contract.

DATED: August 8, 1989
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric V. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which

DATED: August
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

Fred White
Concurring

I, Fred White do hereby affirm upon my Oath as Arbitrator
that I am the individual described in and who executed this instru
ment, which is my AWARD.
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DATED: August
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

John R. Dell Isola
Concurring

I, John R. Dell Isola do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

—

DATED: August
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989

T- V

A / ,

^_^_^^' Wi« -y-r

wT^l^Jfltffe brand
Dissenting

I, W. J. Hillebrand do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: August /->
STATE OF

COUNTY OF

1989

Michael M. Fliniau
Dissenting

I, Michael M. Fliniau do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is.my AWARD.

TWA PILOT SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Air Line Pilots Association
and

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case Nos. NY-130-87
NY-147-87

Trans World Airlines

The stipulated issues are:
1] Whether or not the Company's action in
October of 1987 of utilizing a bid crew
while on a flight assignment to protect
ferry flight 5051 on the 18th of said
month instead of a reserve crew violates
Section 5J and related sections of the
Agreement.
2] Whether or not the Company violated Section 5J and related sections of the Agreement when on November 4, 1987 it used a
bid crew rather than a reserve crew to
protect flight 5065 from Newark to LaGuardia.
It was stipulated that if contract violation(s) are found,
the Board of Arbitration has remedial powers.
A hearing was held on August 24, 1988 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared and were
afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses. Captains W. J. Hillebrand
and Michael Fliniau served as the Company members of the Board of
Arbitration.

Captain Fred White and John R. Dell Isola served as

the Union members on said Board.

The Undersigned was selected as

the Chairman.
The Oath of the Arbitrators was waived. A stenographic record of the aforesaid hearing was taken; the parties
filed post-hearing briefs, and subsequently, the Board of Arbitration met in executive session.
Thereafter, to obtain additional testimony, evidence and
argument on points that he considered possibly relevant, the
Chairman reopened the hearings. As a result, a subsequent hearing
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was held on April 26, 1989.

A stenographic record of that hear-

ing was taken; and the parties filed post-hearing briefs on the
matters dealt with at that hearing.

A subsequent meeting of the

Board of Arbitration was expressly waived.
Section 5J of the contract reads:
When a pilot is called to the airport for
the purpose of acting as pilot on a flight
or flights, and the flying on such flight
or flights amounts to a total flying time
of less than two (2) hours and after the completion of such flying, the pilot is released
from duty to return home or to a hotel, the
pilot shall receive flight pay and credit of
not less than two (2) hours flight and longevity pay (% day, % night) at regular rates for
the equipment so flown or ptoected. Pilots
will not be required to take flights of a special nature at their home domicile or trip turnaround point immediately prior to or upon completion of a regular scheduled flight except
when reserve pilots are not available for such flight.
This paragraph shall not apply when completing
interrupted flights, check flights, training
flights, or practice flights. (Underscoring
supplied).
These disputes center on the underscored part of Section
5J.
It is undisputed that the ferry flights involved in both
issues were "flights of a special nature" and that the crews or
personnel utilized were either "at their home domicile or trip
turn-around point immediately prior to or upon completion of a
regularly scheduled flight."

What is in dispute is whether reserv

pilots were or were not "available for such flight(s)" within the
meaning of said contract Section.
The Company asserts that the use of the crews and personnel
it selected in both instances was contractually proper because
reserve pilots were not available.

It is the Company's position

that "available" means available to protect the flight and the ontime departure schedule of the flight in question.

In other words

-3unless the reserve pilot can be called and can get to the airport
in time to ferry the plare to its departure location so that it can
take off with passengers on or about at its original scheduled
departure time the reserve pilot is "not available."
As I see it, the Company has implied into the language of
Section 5J the phrase "to protect the flight and its on-time departure schedule" as the proper and understood meaning of the
actual language "available for such flight."
I am not persuaded that that implication or interpretation
is correct. Certainly had the parties intended that meaning and
application, it would not have been difficult to include that
specific condition in Section 5J.

Indeed, Section 5J does not

even include the phrase "to protect the flight," whereas other
contract sections do so specifically.
Absent that specific conditional language on a reserve
pilot's "availability," we must look elsewhere in the contract to
see if there is a more explicit definition of "reserve pilot" and,
more pointedly, a definition of his "availability."
In my view, both definitions are found in Section 12 of the
contract. Certain parts of Section 12 make clear, in my judgment,
that reserve pilots are to be used, as in this case, "to protect
a flight" and that that contractual requirement is not limited to
the reserve pilot being able to report in time to insure the
flight's original on-time departure schedule.
Section 12(D)(7) reads in pertinent part:
In order to minimize the necessity of requiring a crew member to protect a flight on an
emergency or call-out basis, the Company shall
use the Number 1 reserve." (emphasis added)
I am satisfied that that was the condition that existed in
both situations involved in this case. The flights were "to be
protected" and as Section 12(D)(7) states, a Number 1 reserve was
to be used, not a crew member.

Further evidence that "to protect

a flight" a reserve pilot in at least the Number 1 reserve status
is to be used, is the language of Section 12(D)(4) which reads in

-4pertinent part:
"In the event that a Number 1 reserve is used
to protect a flight, the Number 2 reserve may
be called to finish the remainder of the set up
period as Number 1 reserve..." (Emphasis added).
I do not find that the use of a Number 1 reserve (or for
that matter a reserve not on Number 1 duty, under the remaining
language of Section 12(D)(7)) is limited to circumstances where
the reserve can be called and can respond in time to protect the
regular and original flight schedule.

Section 12(D)(2) reads:

A pilot assigned as the Number 1 reserve must
be able to report to the airport within two
(2) hours of the first attempt by Crew Schedule to contact such pilot. A pilot assigned as
the Number 2 reserve must be able to report to
the airport within six (6) hours of the first
attempt by Crew Schedule to contact such pilot.
The foregoing contract sections provide the definitions of
"reserve pilot" and "availability" within the meaning and intent
of Section 5J. A "reserve pilot" is a pilot who is "on call" in
either Number 1 or Number 2 status, and as Section 12(A)(1) provides
is "available to fly a reserve schedule, for
each status, for each type of equipment and
within each domicile... (Emphasis added).
He is "available," if, as a Number 1 or Number 2 reserve, he
is able to report, respectively within two hours and six hours.
Consequently, I cannot agree with the Company that under 5J
it need use a reserve pilot only if he can get to the airport in
time to not only "protect the flight" but to protect its regular
and original flight schedule.

If, by using a reserve, there is

a delay in that schedule, that is what the parties agreed to and
bargained for in their contract, and though possibly disruptive
of the Company's flight schedule and inconvenient

for passengers,

it reflects the contract bargain to which the Arbitrator is bound
and which he is required to enforce. Therefore I need not decide
whether in the instant cases a reserve pilot could have responded

-5in time to position the plane for an on-time departure.
Accordingly, under the facts of the two instances in the
two stipulated issues, the Company should have used at least a
Number 1 reserve pilot(s) to ferry the aircraft involved, even if
that delayed the regularly scheduled departure of that aircraft
from its departure location.

A pilot on Number 1 reserve met the

definitions of a "reserve pilot" who was "available" under and
within the meaning of Section 5J of the contract. The Company is
directed to prospectively follow and comply with this ruling and
cease and desist from using crew pilots under the circumstances
they were used in the situations giving rise to the two instant
grievances.
Had it been the intent of the Company when it negotiated
Section 12 later in the bargaining history than when Section 5J
was negotiated, that it would have no effect on the definitions
of "reserve pilot" and "availability" under Section 5J, it should
have changed Section 5J or immunized it from explicit definitions
and conditions of Section 12.

That it did not means that Sections

5J and 12, which both employ the same critical terms and language,
must be reconciled and treated consistantly, not differently.
The testimony at the reopened hearing on the bargaining
history of Section 12 persuades me that both sides obtained benefi ts
The Company got increased flexibility in the use of reserves, and
guarantees of their stand-by readiness with attendant cost reductions, and the Union got contractual assurances that reserves who
had previously "positioned themselves at domiciles" (at their own
expense), but often not used, would be more frequently utilized
if they met the two hour and six hour conditions.

That bilateral

arrangement (which included other cost savings as well for the
Company) cannot now be held inapplicable to Section 5J.
Finally, this decision though a directive for the future,
must be applied under a "rule of reason."

The Union has recog-

nized, and has stated in this record, that there are unique or

-6unusual circumstances where operations may require or justify the
use of regular crews, rather than reserves. That concession, together with the provisions of Section 9(H) are material in that
regard.

Eric
ic J/ Schmertz
Cha irman
DATED: August 8, 1989
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TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants

A W A R D
Case No. 87-0088

and

Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the System Board of
Adjustment in the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs
and allegations of the above-named parties, make the following
AWARD:
The severance of Deanne Haywood from the Company's
employ at the expiration of her medical leave of
absence is reversed. The disagreement over her
medical condition should have been resolved under
Article 23 of the contract. She is restored to
medical leave of absence status and this matter
is remanded to the Company and the Union for processing and for final determination and disposition
under Article 23 of the contract.

Eric/J. Schmertz
Neutral Referee

DATED: September 19, 1989
STATE OF New York )ss COUNTY OF New York )

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument ,^which is m*~-AWARD.

7
DATED: September
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

<
1989

Jane Hefflinger
(Concurring)(Dissenting)

I, Jane Hefflinger do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument which is my AWARD.

DATED: September
STATE OF

1989

Jill J. Swaya
(Concurring)(Dissenting)
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COUNTY OF
I Jill J. Swaya do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who executed
this instrument, which is my AWARD.

TWA - FLIGHT ATTENDANTS

SYSTEM BOARD OF ADJUSTMENT

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
The Independent Federation of
Flight Attendants

OPINION OF CHAIRMAN
Case No:87-0088

and
Trans World Airlines, Inc.
The issue involves the severance from the Company's employ,
of Deanne Haywood
at the expiration of her medical leave of absence, and the Company's denial of her request for restoration to
active status prior to or at that time.
Hearings were held on February 2, 3, and March 29, 1989, at
which time Ms. Haywood, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above-named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine . witnesses. Ms. Jane
Hefflinger and Ms. Jill J. Swaya served respectively as the Union
and Company members of the Board of Arbitration.
served as Neutral Referee.

The Undersigned

The Arbitrators' Oath was waived; the

parties filed post-hearing briefs, following which the Board of
Arbitration met in executive session.
I am satisfied that this dispute should have been handled
and resolved under Article 23 of the collective bargaining agreement.
read:

Pertinent to this matter is Section 23(B)(3) and (C) which
(B) Any employee hereinder who fails to pass a Company physical examination may, at his or her
option, have a review of the case in the following manner:

(3) In the event that the findings of the medical
examiner chosen by the employee shall disagree
with the findings of the medical examiner employed by the Company, the Company will, at the
written request of the employee, ask that the
two medical examiners agree upon and appoint a
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third qualified and disinterested medical
examiner, preferably a specialist for the
purpose of making a further medical examination of the employee.
(C)The said disinterested medical examiner
shall then make a further examination of
the employee in question, and the case
shall be settled on the basis of his findings.
I am persuaded that the "findings" of the grievant's medical
examiner, Dinko Podrug, M.D. and the "findings" of the Company
medical examiner(s) Gerald Laufer M.D. and Dr. Howard Irwin Glazer
(a clinical psychologist) before the grievant's termination are in
"disagreement" within the meaning of the foregoing contract provision .
Dr. Podrug's last diagnosis of the grievant. was "that she
was suffering from borderline personality," but no longer the "dys
thymic disorder" from which she had suffered earlier.
Following his examination of the grievant, Dr. Laufer diagnosed her as "major depression - in remission. Borderline Personality Disorder."
Dr. Glazer's diagnosis, based on pyschological tests was
that she "is suffering from ..." "Major depressive episode, recurrent, in remission" and "borderline personality disorder."
Dr. Glazer reported that the grievant's

Jl major

depression

could recur actively" and that she "could easily decompensate unde
stress . "
The medical testimony and evidence indicate that "dysthymic
disorder" is a mood disorder, the symptoms of which are less sever
than those of a "major depressive episode." Clearly, the medical
examiners in their final reports were in disagreement over whether
the grievant still suffered from the more severe "major depression
or was free of that illness. And assuming that she still suffered
from "dysthymic disorder," despire Dr. Podrug's testimony that she
no longer did, that "disorder," even if only a less severe

-3manifestation of her earlier acknowledged "severe depression" would
still raise a disagreement between or among the medical examiners
over the grievant's diagnosis and condition at the time she sought
reinstatement to active employment as a flight attendant.
Moreover, Article 23 speaks not just of the medical examiners
diagnoses but rather "findings."
I conclude that "findings" is a
broader term than "diagnosis" and includes "prognosis" for the
future including the ability or inability to return to work. Here,
the medical examiners are in sharp disagreement. Dr. Podrug found
that the grievant's "condition has improved sufficiently for her to
resume her normal lifestyle and responsibilities, including fulltime work..."
On the other hand Dr. Laufer said "she would be unable to
function in an in-flight capacity at this time. The prognosis is
poor."

Dr. Glazer found that "while she is psychologically compen-

sated adequately at this time in order to resume a more normal life
style it is my clinical opinion that Ms. Haywood could easily decompensate under stress and is permanently disabled from work as an
international flight attendant."
So, based on the foregoing, I conclude that the grievant's
and Company's medical examiners "disagree" with each others findings within the meaning and intent of the controlling contract
provision.
I also find that within the meaning and intent of Article 23
a "request" for implementation of Article 23 was adequately made.
The grievant is legally represented by the Union. The Union's
business agent, on her behalf, and during the grievance procedure
asked for the appointment of a disinterested medical examiner, as
contemplated by Article 23. In my judgment, his request, as her
representative constituted her request, in constructive if not
actual satisfaction of the requirements of Article 23 (B)(3). As
that notice is unquestioned, I find it immaterial that it may not
have been made in writing. Also the request was denied not because
it was not made timely but because it is the Company's position

-4that the medical examiners were in agreement, not in disagreement.
That that request was not made until the grievance

procedure

and after the grievant had been severed from the employment rolls
because of the expiration of her medical leave is also immaterial.
Article 23 does not put a time limit on the request. Also, I
think it reasonable to conclude that the grievant did not know of
the difference in the findings of the doctors, or she thought,
understandably, that it was unimportant or indeterminative until
her final request for return to work was denied

and her medical

leave expired.
In short, a request for the application of Article 23 is
appropriate when the disagreement between the medical examiners
results, as in this case, with the denial of the request to return
to work, and the expiration of the medical leave. That is when
the dispute or disagreement becomes justiciable, and though it
could have been processed earlier, the request in this case, under
these circumstances, was certainly not stale.
Finally, as I. have held that Article 23 is applicable, it
would be manifestly unfair and unreasonable to

foreclose the grie\t and

rights in opposition to her termination, merely because they were
not asserted while she was still an employee. Put another way,
to contest the propriety of her termination, she and the Union are
entitled to make use of a contract right which they believe has
been violated or improperly ignored, which if applied would or
might have preserved her employment status.
Accordingly, the grievant's severance from the Company's
employ at the expiration of her medical leave of absence is reversed. She is restored to medical leave of absence status and
this matter is remanded to the Company and the Union for processing
and for final determination under Article 23 of the contract.

DATED: September 19, 1989
Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Bridge and Tunnel Officers
Benevolent Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 1301 88

and
Triborough Bridge and
Tunnel Authority

The issue is:
What shall be the disposition of the Union's
grievance #88-18 dated September 14, 1988?
A hearing was held on February 1, 1989 at which time representatives of the above-named Union and Authority appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine

witnesses.

The dispute and the grievance centers on the Union's claim

$

that Jewish Bridge and Tunnel officers (hereinafter referred to
as "BTO's) who requested and were granted time off for Rosh
Hashanah and Yom Kippur, September 12, 13 and 21, 1988, should
not have been charged for those days off against their accrued
vacation (or other) time.
It is undisputed that historically and by practice BTO's
did not receive time off for observance of religious holidays
(whether Jewish or Christian) without that time being charged to
accrued vacation or

other accrued time benefits.

It is also undisputed that historically and by practice,
clerical and maintenance employees and supervisory personnel did
and do get religious days off without the time being so charged.
The disagreement giving rise to the instant grievance arose
because of a difference in the Authority's notice regarding the

-2aforesaid Jewish holidays in 1988.

In prior years, the notices

made clear that maintenance and clerical employees could request
the days off (i.e. Good Friday, Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur)
without the time being charged to accrued benefits.

And in prior

years, the notices affecting BTO's reiterated the policy of permitting requests for such time off, but with the explicit provision that such time would be charged.

However, for the Jewish

holidays of 1988, the Authority's notice, by memo to Raymond
Hickman, the Vice President of Operations, did not differentiate
between maintenance and clerical employees and BTO"s.

Rather,

it appeared to apply to all employees, including BTO's with the
provision that absences granted "will not be charged to vacation."
That memo, in its entirety reads"
"DATE:
TO:
FROM:
RE:

August 30, 1988
Raymond Hickman
Elaine St. Bernard
Religious Holidays

Monday, September 12, and Tuesday, September
13, 1988 are Rosh Hashanah, the Jewish New
Year, and Wednesday, September 21, 1988 is
Yom Kippur, the Day of Atonement.
Employees who wish to absent themselves for
the purpose of observing religious duties on
Monday, September 12, Tuesday, September 13,
and Wednesday, September 21, 1988, may submit
requests to their respective supervisors not
later than September 7, 1988. Such absences
will not be chargeable to vacation.
The question of granting all or any such absences is left to the judgment of the respective supervisors for recommendations
and will depend entirely on whether the work
of the division can be carried on properly.
(emphasis added)
As the memo was addressed to Mr. Hickman, who had jurisdiction over BTO's as well as maintenance and clerical employees,
it was not unreasonable for the BTO's and the Union to assume
that the policy had changed and that for 1988 BTO's could request
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the time off, and if granted pursuant to the last paragraph of
aforesaid, the absence would not be charged to vacation or other
accrued t ime.
The Authority contends that that part of the memo was a
typographical error, and that there was no change in the long
standing policy or practice.

I accept the Authority's explanatior

of a typographical or drafting error.
The question however is whether the Authority

corrected

the error within the time it had to do so, and whether, if it
attempted to make the correction, it did so effectively when it
had the chance and time to do so.
I conclude it did not adequately and effectively correct
the error, though it had the time and the means to do so.
The Authority acknowledges

that it recognized the error on

the day the memo was issued and posted, August 30th.

Though it

had up to twelve days to correct it prior to the first day of
Rosh Hashanah, it did not make the correction adequately or
effectively.

It did not post a corrected or superseding

It did not officially notify the Union or the employees.

notice.
What

it did do was to notify the various departmental supervisors and
left it to them to notify the BTO's presumably if and when Jewish
BTO's applied for the days off.

There is no

evidence in the re-

cord that the various supervisors or department heads notified
the employees under their jurisdiction, or if they did, when and
how.
Indeed, based on the record, it appears to me that nothing
was done until one or more BTO's applied for the time off.

Then,

for the first time they were told, verbally, that the August 30th
memo was in error.

Also, the Authority did not officially notify
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the Union of the error.

What it did was to mention it to a

member of the Union's executive committee, again verbally, and
in my view, casually.

The Authority witness could not even

identify which Union executive board committee member was so told.
Under the foregoing circumstances, I do not find it unreasonable for the grievants

and the Union to rely on the in-

clusive wording of the August 30th memo and notice, and not to
treat or accept the late and casual attempts at correction by
the Authority, as an effective change in or cancellation of what
the August 30th memo said.
In short, the Authority had plenty of time to officially
and institutionally correct what I believe

was a typographical

error in its August 30th notice and memo, but failed to do so in
a timely, adequate and effective manner.

Therefore those BTO's

who requested and were granted the Jewish holidays of Rosh Hashana
and Yom Kippur, September 12, 13 and 21, 1988 should not be chargejd
for those absences against accrued vacation or other accrued
benefits.

If they were so charged, they shall be made whole.

The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above-named parties, makes the following AWARD:
For the Jewish holidays of September 12, 13
and 21, 1988 the Union's grievance #88-1.8 dated
September 14, 1988, is granted.

DATED: February 6, 1989
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York )SS' '

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 8~891

and

A W A R D
Grievance N o . 021-11-87

Union Carbide Corporation
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrators in
the above matter, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above-named parties, make the following AWARD:
1]

The Company did not act with proper
cause in discharging Milton Sadofski.

2]

He shall be reinstated.

3]

His reinstatement shall be without
back pay.

DATED: June
1989
STATE OF New York)ss. :
COUNTY OF New York)

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
Michael Pappa
Concurring with #1 and #2
Dissenting from #3 above

I, Michael Pappa do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

DATED: June
STATE OF
COUNTY OF

1989
T. M. Galusha
Dissenting from #1 and #2
Concurring with #3 above

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
International Union, Local 8-891

CHAIRMAN'S OPINION
Grievance No. 021-11-87

and
Union Carbide Corporation

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Company act with proper cause in
discharging Milton Sadofski? If not, what
shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held in Bound Brook, New Jersey on November
1, 1988 and December 28, 1988 at which time Mr. Sadofski, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant" and representatives of the
above-named Union and Company appeared.

All concerned were af-

forded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to
examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The Board of Arbitration

consisted of Mr. T. M. Galusha, Company designee, Mr. Michael
Pappa, Union designee, and the Undersigned as Chairman.

The Oath

of the Arbitrators was waived; the parties filed post-hearing
briefs; and subsequently, the board met in executive session.
The grievant is charged with industrial sabotage.

Specifi-

cally the Company claims that he willfully and maliciously cut
the belt on a heat sealer machine.

It asserts that the grievant

had a motive for doing so; was in the area of the machine at the
time the Company says the belt was cut; and that based on scientific evidence, the cut was made by a knife issued to the grievant
as a work tool and found in his locker.
The Company's case against the grievant is entirely circumstantial.

Though it is well settled that circumstantial evidence

can add up to the clear and convincing proof required in discharge
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cases, it does not do so in this matter.
evidence of the grievant's culpability.

There is no direct
He was not seen tamper-

ing with the machine or working on it or with it in any suspicious
manner.

He made no admissions against interest or any other im-

plicating statements or engaged in any incrminating conduct.
The Company has not persuaded me by clear and convincing
evidence that the belt was cut on April 23, 1988 sometime between
8:30 AM and 9:30 AM.

The cut was discovered at 9:30 AM when the

machine was put into production.

But the evidence fails to estab-

lish when the cut was in fact made, or even the probable time.
The machine had been in the shop for repairs.

Sometime

around 4 PM on April 22nd it was returned to the production floor.
I consider it entirely possible and reasonable that the cut could
have been made anytime after 4 PM on the 22nd of April, or indeed
even while the machine was in the shop.

The cut

was not dis-

covered until Maintenance Mechanic Collins worked on it preliminary to commencing its operation between 9 and 9:30 AM on the
23rd of April.

The Company fixes the time of the cut, not on any

direct evidence, but on an inferential conclusion founded on the
grievant's proximity to the area and on his motive.

To do so is

to "bootstrap" a critical conclusion on circumstances which do
not probatively establish the time of the act of sabotage, especially when those circumstances are themselves disputed, and even
if true, do not establish the required nexus between the act and
the time it was committed.
The machine was the center of attention while in the shop.
Apparently, it was in and out of the shop frequently for repairs,
and because those repairs often resulted in extra work for the
mechanics, including apparently overtime for Collins, it was
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dubbed "Collins" Cow."

At times the employees "dressed" the

machine to look like a cow, using a glove to represent its udder.
I do not consider it impossible or unreasonable therefore for the
belt to have been cut at a different time and under different
circumstances than claimed by the Company, and for other reasons,
including reasons relating to its special attention.

In the ab-

sence of evidence fixing the time of the cut independent of the
grievant's work locations and alleged motivation, I cannot conclude that the cut was made within one hour prior to the start up
of the machine.

That being so, I consider it immaterial where

the grievant was working or his proximity to the machine on the
morning of April 23rd.
The Company has not, to my satisfaction, adequately connected the grievant's "motive" to the act of sabotage.

It is the

Company's claim that the grievant cut the belt in angry retaliation to word at about 8:30 AM on April 23rd that he was to be
disciplined for an earlier offense "of sleeping on the job." The
testimony is sharply conflicting and unclear on whether in fact
the grievant knew of that discipline before the time that the
Company claims the belt was cut.

So, a retaliatory nexus between

notice of discipline and the act of sabotage has not been convincingly shown.

But even if the grievant did know he was to be

discipline for an earlier offense, and even if the cut was made
at the time fixed by the Company, there is still insufficient
evidence to clearly and convincingly show and conclude that a
connection between notice of discipline and retaliatory sabotage
should be made.

Indeed, based on the Company's theory, anyone in

the plant who had been previously disciplined could have a motive
to retaliate.

I understand the Company's reasoning and even its

-4suspicions, but suspicions fall short of the probative connections
that the clear and convincing standard requires.
The evidence regarding the grievant's knife is more serious,
but in the final analysis, inconclusive.

Frankly, I was not im-

pressed with the "scientific" or test procedures employed by the
forensic expert who testified.

His testimony was conclusory, but,

in my view, inadequately documented by controlled and comparable
test results leading to those conclusions.

He testified that:

"Based on the examinat ions and comparisons
which were conducted, it was concluded
that the ... belt had been severed by the
K5 knife or another knife exhibiting microscopic cutting edge characteristics similar
to the K5 knife. The latter possibility is
considered remote." (emphasis added)
Among the frailties in Mr. DeRonja's study is that he made
no cut comparisons between

the grievant's K5 knife (i.e. the

knife issued to the grievant and found and retrieved by the Company
from his locker) and any of the many other K5 knives issued to
and used by other employees.

His comparisons were with K2, K3

and K4 knives, which were entirely different, with obviously different cutting edges and capabilities.

I fail to see how these

comparisons conclusively identify the grievant's knife as the one
responsible for the cut.
And again, with the time of the cut not adequately established, the examination of the knives of just those other employees
in the area at particular hours that morning, is too narrow a
comparison.
Moreover, with that narrow comparison, Mr. DeRonja's testimony that the belt had been severed by the

grievant's K5 knife

or another knife ... exhibiting "similar characteristics" leaves
the latter as a reasonable possibility, despite his conclusory
view that that possibility "is considered remote."

This is a dis-
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charge case, where the affected employee is charged with a very
serious offense which, if sustained, will not only cost him his
job, but impair his future employability elsewhere.

It seems to

me therefore that the possibility that a different K5 knife cut
the belt should be, if not eliminated by scientific evidence, at
least reduced to the "remoteness" claimed, not by an examination
of the grievants K5 knife alone, but by comparisons with other
K5 knives.

Otherwise, I am not prepared to accept the testimony

that only, or even probably, it was the grievant's K5 knife.

In-

deed, DeRonja conceded that the test cut he made with the grievant's K5 knife did not precisely duplicate the original cut.

His

test cut duplicated some characteristics of the original cut, not
all of them.

His explanation that there is never a "100% match"

is unacceptable to me in the absence of controlled and comparison
tests of other K5 knives showing the same variations.

Based on

the record before me, the variations that he concedes

leaves his

conclusion that it was the grievant's knife that cut the belt,
unproved by the clear and convincing standard required.

Also,

he was unable to show, and apparently did not record, as he made
his test cuts, the series, sequence, and points of similar or dissimilar characteristics.

Not to do so leaves his analysis scien-

tifically inadequate and inconclusive.
Finally, the knife was not found on the grievant's person,
in use or in his possession at the time that the cut was discovered
It was found in his locker, (which the Company opened).

I am not

prepared to rule out the possibility that it may have been used by
someone else, at whatever the critical time was when the belt was
cust, the inconclusiveness of the expert forensic testimony notwithstanding .
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I arn persuaded however, that the grievant failed to diligent
ly seek other employment during the period of his discharge and
therefore failed to meet his duty to mitigate damages.

I believe

that there were other jobs available that were "commensurate"
with his skills and that he had the duty, at least, to seek them
out.

He did not do so, and by his own testimony did not look for

other employment (except to file one application) from the time
his unemployment benefits ran out to the date of the arbitration,
a period of 566 days.

That being so, I shall order his reinstate-

ment, but without back pay.

Dated: June 6, 1989

Eric J. Schmertz
Chairman

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local Union 455, International
Brotherhood o f Electrical Workers

A W A R D

and
Western Massachusetts
Electric Company
In my Award of June 12, 1987 I stated:
"The Arbitrator retains jurisdiction for
resolution of disputes over the interpretation and application of the foregoing AWARD."
Following the rendition of the Award, disputes between the
parties did arise, and were submitted to me for resolution.
Hearings were duly held and briefs submitted. The parties
were afforded full opportunity to submit their respective cases
on those disputes over the application and interpretation of the
June 12, 1987 Award.
In resolution of those disputes, I make the following AWARD:
1. For the year 1986, the seven reinstated
employees shall receive either vacation pay
in lieu of time off or vacation time off with
pay, at the option of the Company, in a prorata amount consistent with the amount of
time they actively worked in 1986 and the amount of time they would have worked had they
only been suspended for the period(s) sustained
by my Award, and not discharged.
Therefore Michael Breton, Kevin Dowd, Kevin
O'Keefe, William Smith and Theodore Williams
shall be credited for 1986 vacation only until
March 13, 1986. Brian Kenney and Earl Watson
shall be credited for that period, plus the
period from May 7, 1986 to the end of the year.
2. The seven reinstated employees were and
are entitled to medical insurance during the
time they were out of work. Those who incurred medical expenses that they paid themselves, which otherwise would have been covered
by the Company's medical insurance plan shall be
reimbursed by the Company in an amount equal to
what that coverage would have been. The Company

-2may deduct therefrom the amount of the premiums,
if any, that said employees would have contributed under the provisions of the medical plan.
Accordingly, the expenses incurred by Kevin
Dowd, Michael Breton, Theodore Williams and
Gary Monte shall be reimbursed pursuant to the
foregoing. Said expenses are listed on page
9 of the Union's brief.
3. The rates of pay of Brian Kenney and Earl
Watson upon reinstatement shall include the
merit raises which would have come into effect
during the period I held they were wrongfully
out of work. Therefore their rates of pay on
reinstatement should have included merit increases that would have been due from May 7,
1986 to the date of reinstatement. The same is
true for any other wage increase during that
period. In other words, the Union's claim that
merit raises be included in their wage histories,
is granted to the extent that it applies to
merit increases that came into effect after May
7, 1986.
On the foregoing basis, Kevin O'Keefe whose
full period out was deemed a disciplinary suspension is not entitled to have the merit raises
that came into effect during that suspension included in his rate at reinstatement or his wage
history.
4. In accordance with the understanding between
the parties, reached at the hearing,
"All seven reinstated employees
retain their original date-ofhire seniority dates and their
pensions are not affected, i.e.
will not be lessened, due to
their various periods of suspension . "
5. The remedy sought by the Union for Kevin
O'Keefe as a result of the withdrawal of his
"unescorted access" status and his resultant
disqualification from his Mechanic job, is
denied on procedural grounds. It is now immaterial
whether the "background investigation" should have
taken place or may not have taken place had he not
been discharged. The allegations have been made
and the circumstances as alleged by the Company
have been revealed. As a matter of policy, I
cannot undo that ,now or treat it as if it never
happened. However, I make no determinations on
the merits of the investigation or its alleged
findings. That is beyond my reserved jurisdiction.

-3O'Keefe and the Union are entitled to challenge
the propriety and the findings of the investigation on the merits in any other proceeding or
forum available to them. In that proceeding the
remedy the Union seeks herein may be sought and
is not prejudiced or pre-judged by this Award.
In any such proceeding the rights of the parties
are fully and expressly reserved.
6. My back pay Award, is as I stated, limited
by the provision of Section XVII of the contract.
The "twenty working days after the close of the
hearing" referred to therein, means twenty working days after all evidence and argument, including the stenographic record and briefs were received by me. This is consistent not only with
the application of the rules of the American
Arbitration Association but also with the generally well settled interpretation of that phrase
by arbitrators. In that regard, namely the point
at which the twenty working days begins to run,
the Union's argument is correct.
The formula to be applied in calculating back
pay under the original Award for Kenney and
Watson is as follows:
From May 7, 1986 to twenty working days after
the close of the hearings in this arbitration, as
stated and defined in #6 above, they shall be
paid at the applicable contract rates, for time
they would have been scheduled to work during
that period. This applies to straight time work,
shift work, premium time work and overtime work,
provided they would have been so scheduled. The
Company may deduct from that back pay respectively
$1092 earned elsewhere by Kenney and $21,320.81
earned elsewhere by Watson.
If those earnings
elsewhere were for a period in excess of the period for which back pay is awarded, the deductions
shall then be prorated.

DATED: October 25, 1989
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York ) s °-1.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

As acknowledged by the Union in its brief.
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I, Eric J. Schmertz do hereby affirm upon my Oath as
Arbitrator that I am the individual described in and who
executed this instrument, which is my AWARD.

